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RESOLVING ELECTION ERROR: THE DYNAMIC
ASSESSMENT OF MATERIALITY
JUSTIN LEVITT*
ABSTRACT
The ghosts of the 2000 presidential election will return in 2012.
Photo-finish and error-laden elections recur in each cycle. When the
margin of error exceeds the margin of victory, officials and courts
must decide which, if any, errors to discount or excuse, knowing that
the answer will likely determine the election’s winner. Yet despite
widespread agreement on the likelihood of another national melt-
down, neither courts nor scholars have developed consistent princi-
ples for resolving the errors that cause the chaos.
This Article advances such a principle, reflecting the underlying
values of the electoral process. It argues that the resolution of an
election error should turn on its materiality: whether the error is
material to the eligibility of a voter or the determination of her ballot
preference. 
In developing this argument, this Article offers the first trans-
substantive review of materiality as a governing principle. It then
introduces the insight that, unlike the evaluation of materiality in
other contexts, the materiality of a voting error may be reassessed
over time. This dynamic assessment of materiality best accommo-
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dates the purposes of a decision rule for election error. Indeed, the
insight is most powerful when the stakes are highest: when an
election hangs in the balance. Finally, this Article discusses the
pragmatic application of the materiality principle, including the
invigoration of an underappreciated federal statute poised to change
the way that disputed elections are resolved, in 2012 and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
Twelve years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v.
Gore1 shocked a nation and catalyzed an academic field. In many
ways, the controversy of 2000 marked the rebirth of the study of
election law. But with all of the ink spilled on the law of democracy
in the last decade, the difficulty at the heart of this catalytic event
has been sorely neglected.
Humans are imperfect. This is no less true in our ability to
execute election instructions than in any other arena. In Florida in
2000, citizens made mistakes, inter alia, in registering to vote, com-
pleting and mailing absentee ballots and requests for those ballots,
and most notoriously, indicating their preferred choices on ballots.2
Citizens made similar mistakes elsewhere around the country, in
2000 and long before. The only meaningful difference is that in
Florida the mistakes happened to be outcome determinative, and
spectacularly so. 
These mistakes and opportunities for others have not vanished,
and with surprising frequency, they continue to represent the dif-
ference between those who prevail in an election and those who do
not.3 The fundamental problem of what to do with these mistakes
remains curiously unresolved. Particularly when minor errors—by
voters and by election officials—exceed the margin of victory, courts
are placed in the unenviable position of deciding which, if any, of
these errors to discount or excuse, with the knowledge that their
judgment will likely determine the election’s winner. 
Courts have had little help in this endeavor thus far. Though
scholars have noted that the aggregation of election errors will
likely cause another national meltdown,4 the most prominent
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. See, e.g., id. at 102-03; Jacobs v. Seminole Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519, 521
(Fla. 2000). See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA
DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
vote2000/report/main.htm.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch.,
Getting from Here to There in Election Reform, Speech Delivered at Okla. City Univ. Sch. of
Law (Apr. 3, 2008), in 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 33, 34-38 (2009); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond
the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral
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analytical frameworks in the field, and particularly the prevailing
frame of rights-based constitutional adjudication, provide little
useful guidance for decision makers charged with averting crisis
wrought by the aggregation of individual mistakes.5 Authors have
examined methods for determining the extent of election-related
error,6 the design of institutions to review claims of error,7 and
remedial options to salvage an election when all hope for directly
confronting the error is lost.8 But very little scholarship offers a
consistent principle or set of principles for addressing the appropri-
ate legal impact of an error in the first instance.9 
Absent such principles, some decision makers have attempted to
intuit whether errors are “large” or “small” in order to determine
whether the associated ballots should be counted.10 Others have
turned to an assessment of responsibility or fault: voters are
relieved from errors made by others but held to their own mistakes
or deficiencies.11 Neither approach has faced significant scholarly
scrutiny; on further examination, both prove to be substantially
flawed.12 In this Article, I suggest a principle better suited to the
purposes of the voting process.
The principle I propose is materiality: particularly, the material-
ity of an error to an assessment of the affected individual’s eligibil-
Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 944 (2005).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory,
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 352-61 (2007).
7. See Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2013); Foley, supra note 6, at 361-81.
8. See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265
(2007) (discussing systemic remedies for election-related errors, such as rerunning the
election); Michael J. Pitts, Heads or Tails?: A Modest Proposal for Deciding Close Elections,
39 CONN. L. REV. 739 (2006) (recommending the random disposition of elections within a
certain margin, including elections with substantial rates of error).
9. One of the few exceptions may be the interpretive rule suggested by Professor Rick
Hasen in his exposition of the “Democracy Canon” and the developing response that Hasen’s
suggestion seems to have engendered. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 69 (2009) [hereinafter Hasen, Democracy Canon]; Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining
the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1051 (2010); Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of the
Democracy Canon and the Virtues of Simplicity: A Reply to Professor Elmendorf, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 1173 (2010); see discussion infra text accompanying notes 64-66, 240-44. 
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part II.B.
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ity or ballot preference. Materiality plays a critical role in contract,
in tortious and criminal fraud, in the law of securities, and in many
other legal contexts, separating predicates of legal consequence from
those that the law ignores.13 Yet I am aware of no methodical trans-
substantive examination of this notoriously flexible idea. This
Article offers such an examination, setting forth a taxonomy of
materiality designed to assist in the identification of the election
errors that should preclude the counting of a ballot.
Moreover, this Article unearths a feature of the concept that
proves pivotal in the election context: the materiality of a voting
error may change. This, too, is a notion mostly overlooked. Little
work in the field of voting rights has addressed the impact of the
ability to assess and reassess determinative rulings at different
points in time within the election cycle.14 Today, errors in the elec-
tion process are generally evaluated at the time they are committed,
and the voter is saddled by that evaluation despite the fact that the
error may later become wholly unimportant.15 The recognition that
materiality may change over time highlights the inadequacy of the
existing approach to the assessment of error in the election context. 
Furthermore, the insight into the dynamic nature of materiality
is most powerful when the stakes are highest. When errors leave the
result of an election in question, there often appears to be a conflict
between two fundamental precepts: the rule of law and majority
rule. A proper appreciation for the changing materiality of an elec-
tion-related error can help to resolve this perceived, but ultimately
artificial, conflict.16
Finally, I explain how the materiality principle may be imple-
mented in practice. The most tangible manifestation of the principle
currently exists in a surprisingly underappreciated provision of the
landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits disenfranchise-
ment on the basis of some errors or omissions that are not material
to a voter’s qualifications.17 Few courts or commentators have
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. The leading pertinent work is by Professor Adam Cox, who concentrates on the
difficulties in assessing harm and remedy to groups of voters across election cycles. Adam B.
Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361 (2007).
15. See infra Part III.B.3.
16. See infra Part III.C.4.d.
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101(a), 78 Stat. 241, 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
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recognized the power of this provision, and none have done so with
an appreciation of the dynamic quality of materiality; indeed, proper
application of the statute might well have yielded different results
in several recent elections.18 Yet even the Civil Rights Act does not
apply the materiality principle as thoroughly as would be beneficial.
I therefore suggest that states explicitly incorporate the principle
into their own election codes.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates the recurring
nature of the problem with a brief review of notable and often
outcome-determinative errors that have materialized in recent
elections. Part II explores some of the potential decision rules for
confronting these errors. Part III offers the materiality principle
that I propose as superior. Of particular note, I introduce for the
first time the insight that in the voting context, an assessment of
materiality may change over time. Recognizing the dynamic nature
of materiality, moreover, better serves the rationales supporting the
election process than any of the available alternatives for confront-
ing error. Finally, Part IV describes how the materiality principle
may be implemented in practice, including the first sustained
scholarly review of the Civil Rights Act’s materiality provision, a
ready vehicle for applying the concept in many circumstances.
I. ERRORS IN RECENT ELECTIONS
The prospect that the balance of an election might turn on the
resolution of errors did not die with Bush v. Gore. In 2010, the
election for a U.S. Senate seat in Alaska was cast into controversy
when incumbent Senator Lisa Murkowski lost the Republican Party
primary and announced her intention to run as a write-in can-
didate.19 In many states, write-in candidates distribute stickers that
their supporters can affix to a ballot to avoid any potential ambigu-
ity in their choice.20 But a few years prior, the Alaska legislature
outlawed such stickers after determining that they would foul the
§ 1971(a)(2)(B) (2006)).
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. Nate Silver, Alaska Race May Make for Long Election Night, N.Y. TIMES
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 18, 2010, 10:19 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
10/18/alaska-race-may-make-for-long-election-night/.
20. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 7.50 (West 2011) (allowing for use of sticker).
90 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:083
state’s new optical scan readers.21 Suddenly, in a race polling well
within a comfortable margin of error on the eve of the election,22
there was a substantial likelihood that the election result might
turn on the spelling and/or penmanship of Murkowski’s supporters.
Sure enough, voters actually cast a healthy number of ballots for
“Murcowski,” “Morcowski,” and “McCosky,” with corresponding
controversy as to the outcome of the race.23
Two years earlier, another U.S. Senate election left at least 4,797
absentee ballots of disputed validity—far more than the 312-vote
margin of victory.24 These absentee ballots were rejected in the
initial election canvass, and most remained uncounted even after a
thorough recount and vigorously disputed contest proceedings.25
Officials rejected many of the absentee ballots because of alleged
errors.26 Some voters failed to sign absentee ballot materials27 or
signed them in the wrong place.28 Others completed their own
materials accurately, but witnesses observing the process submitted
flawed information.29
21. 2000 Alaska Sess. Laws 14 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.361); S. State Affairs
Comm., 21st Leg., Committee Minutes, at Item No. 2329 (Mar. 16, 2000), http://www.legis
.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?house=S&Session=21&Comm=STA&date=20000
316&time=1540; H. State Affairs Standing Comm., 21st Leg., Committee Minutes, at Item
No. 1970 (Feb. 8, 2000), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?house=
H&Session=21&comm=STA&date=20000208&time=0811.
22. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 19.
23. Sean Cockerham, 98% of Write-In Votes Go to Murkowski, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 11, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 22507177.
24. Sheehan v. Franken (In re Contest of Gen. Election Held on November 4, 2008, for the
Purpose of Electing a U.S. Senator from the State of Minn.) (Franken Trial), No. 62-CV-09-56,
2009 WL 981934, ¶¶ 12, 126 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 2009).
25. Sheehan v. Franken (In re Contest of Gen. Election Held on November 4, 2008, for the
Purpose of Electing a U.S. Senator from the State of Minn.) (Franken Appeal), 767 N.W.2d
453, 456-58 (Minn. 2009); Franken Trial, 2009 WL 981934, ¶¶ 129-138.
26. See Franken Trial, 2009 WL 981934, ¶¶ 85, 92-93. 
27. Absentee ballot envelopes identify voters; they remain sealed with the ballot inside
until election officials determine that they comply with state law and that the ballots inside
may therefore be counted. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 203B.121 (2011). In order to preserve the
secrecy of an individual voter’s political choices, there may be no marks that serve to identify
the voter on the ballot itself. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 204C.18(2) (2011). Once the ballot envelope
is opened and the absentee ballot is separated from its envelope, the identity of the individual
casting votes via a particular ballot cannot be determined. 
28. See, e.g., Contestants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 27-30, 34-37, Franken Trial, No. 62-CV-09-56 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 2009),
2009 WL 981934. 
29. See, e.g., id. at 12, 39-43; Affidavit of Charles N. Nauen in Support of Petition by
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Though the Minnesota race drew the most attention, ample errors
also arose elsewhere. Palm Beach County, Florida—no stranger to
election controversy—also rejected absentee ballots with legitimate
signatures written in the wrong location.30 Officials in Waller
County, Texas—home to Prairie View A&M College (a “historically
black university”) and a history of alleged voting rights abuses31—
rejected registration forms with complete addresses but without ZIP
codes.32 Waller County also rejected versions of registration forms
that were not the most recent forms produced;33 some counties in
Indiana did the same.34 Colorado rejected voter registration forms
on which applicants provided the last four digits of their Social
Security number but did not check a box explaining that they had
no driver’s license or state identification number to provide in-
stead.35 Ohio rejected absentee ballot applications for citizens who
did not check a box indicating their status as a qualified elector,36
Certain Minnesota Voters to Have Their Votes Counted Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 204B.44,
at Exhibit 3, ¶ 14, Peterson v. Ritchie, No. A09-0065 (Minn. Jan. 13, 2009).
30. Jane Musgrave, 372 Absentee Ballots Tossed, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.)
(Nov. 15, 2008), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-11-15/news/0811150020_1_voter-s-
signature-absentee-ballots-military-ballots.
31. Nina Perales et al., Voting Rights in Texas: 1982-2006, MALDEF, 18-19, 25-26 (June
2006), http://www.maldef.org/resources/publications/TexasVRA.pdf.
32. See United States v. Waller County, Texas, No. 4:08-cv-03022, ¶¶ 3, 6(b)(i) (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 17, 2008) (consent decree), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/
waller_cd.pdf. The U.S. Department of Justice sued, and the subsequent settlement required
that these registration forms be accepted. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
33. Id. ¶ 6(b)(ii).
34. See Agreed Entry and Order in Resolution of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
at 1, Brown v. Rokita, No. 1:08-cv-01484 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2008). On the eve of the election,
the state settled a lawsuit and agreed to accept these registration forms. Id. at 1-2.
35. Myung Oak Kim, Secretary of State Stands by Registration Check-Box Policy, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS (Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/Oct/22/secretary-
of-state-stands-by-registration-check/; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-204(2)(f.5), (3)(c) (2008);
COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-1 (2.6.3) (2008); Letter from Maurice G. Knaizer, Colo. Deputy
Attorney Gen. & Monica M. Márgurz, Colo. Assistant Solicitor Gen., to Mike Coffman, Colo.
Sec’y of State (Oct. 24, 2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/d79a4060e5464ecb06_kam6ivbyr.pdf.
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires an applicant for voter registration to
provide on the registration form her driver’s license number, if she has one, and otherwise the
last four digits of her Social Security number, if she has one. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i)
(2006). The federal law does not require an applicant to indicate specifically when she does
not have a driver’s license number. Id.
36. See State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, 899 N.E.2d 120, 121-22 (Ohio 2008). The Ohio
Supreme Court required that the state process the absentee ballot applications even when the
checkbox was not marked. Id.
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and rejected some provisional ballots from voters who signed but did
not print their names or who signed and printed their names in the
wrong place on the ballot.37
The litany from 2008 is no anomaly. In every single election cycle,
errors occur. Some are major, some are minor; some are novel, some
familiar. And in every single cycle, these errors prove outcome
determinative somewhere.38 For William Davignon and Michael
37. See State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 900 N.E.2d 982, 991-92 (Ohio 2008) (per curiam).
The Ohio Supreme Court required that the state reject provisional ballots that did not include
both name and signature. Id.
38. Consider just a few examples from the preceding years:
2007: Mansfield v. McShurley, 911 N.E.2d 581, 582-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (adjudicating
the validity of absentee ballots that an official failed to initial before sending); Margaret
McHugh, Votes Are In but Results Are Still Out, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 2, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 4055056 (reporting on a vote disputed because of officials’ failure to
list voters’ first and last names in the correct order on the voter rolls).
2006: Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d 1154, 1155, 1158-59 (Alaska 2007) (resolving the impact
of voters’ failure to list mailing address in addition to residential address on ballots); Jeff
Shields, Provisional Ballots May Hold Key in Chesco, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 23, 2006, at B1
(describing multiple minor errors on the face of provisional ballot envelopes).
2005: Harrison v. Stanley, 193 S.W.3d 581, 582-83, 585-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (reviewing
signatures on absentee ballot envelopes deemed not to match signatures on the associated
ballot applications, despite testimony from the voters that all relevant materials were theirs);
Judge Rejects Disputed Ballots from Primary, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 2005, at B2
(reporting on absentee ballots that were “either not signed or not notarized”); Frank Juliano,
Recounts Could Shake Up Milford Boards, CONN. POST, Nov. 10, 2005 (reporting on an
official’s failure to sign absentee ballots next to a date stamp).
2004: In re Primary Election Ballot Disputes 2004, 857 A.2d 494, 504-05 (Me. 2004)
(determining the impact of voters’ failure to fill in checkboxes on the ballot, which led
to—inter alia—the defeat of a write-in candidate who was running unopposed); Greg Moran,
Re-election of Murphy Will Stand, Judge Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 3, 2005, at A-1
(describing an election controversy centering on voters’ failure to fill in a checkbox next to the
name of a write-in candidate). 
2003: Mary Beth Lane, Incumbent Will Remain Mayor of Cambridge, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Jan. 9, 2004, at 5D (reporting on voters’ failure to cast ballots in the proper precinct).
2002: Editorial, Count All Valid Votes, DENVER POST, Nov. 21, 2002, at B-6 (describing
voters’ failure to check boxes on provisional ballots explaining the reason for casting the
provisional ballots); John Fund, Op-Ed., We May HAVA Problem, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2004),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122485692267966609.html (same); Kenneth Heard, Absentee
Ballot Lawsuit Ousts Mayor, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 3, 2003, at 9 (reporting on voter’s
failure to submit “required affidavits from medical personnel” with absentee ballot cast for
medical reasons); David Snyder, Write-in Mayoral Bid Wins in Md. Court, WASH. POST, July
31, 2002, at B1 (describing an election dispute over whether votes should be counted despite
failure to include first name of write-in candidate); Todd von Kampen, Write-in Mayoral Bid
Dashed, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Feb. 7, 2003, at 1b (reporting on voters’ failure to fill in a
checkbox next to the name of a write-in candidate).
2001: Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002, 1005-13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (describing the
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Carney, lightning struck twice. In both 2001 and 2003, Davignon
beat Carney by one vote for a county legislative seat; the first time,
the election depended on an absentee ballot signed on the wrong
line, and the second time, a timely ballot with a missing time
stamp.39 To be sure, it is unusual to see outcome-determinative
errors in consecutive races between the same candidates. But for
most election participants, once is more than enough.
II. THE NEED FOR A PRINCIPLE TO RESOLVE ERRORS
Election errors like those above are the inevitable consequences
of election procedures. These procedures serve a critical purpose:
they help a community arrive at a reliable shared understanding of
the individuals empowered to represent and govern it, which in
turn—at least classically—secures the consent of those governed.40
Election procedures regulate who can vote for whom, when, and
how, and the means by which those preferences are acknowledged
and tallied to produce a representative vested with the authority of
the state. Some of these procedures aim to protect the integrity or
perceived integrity of the election against attempts to manipulate
the results; others aim to make the election easier for a bureaucracy
with limited resources to administer. It is not possible to run a
reliable election without pervasive procedural regulations.41
failure to spell a candidate’s name correctly, write a candidate’s name on the proper ballot
line, and fill in a checkbox next to the write-in candidate’s name).
39. Carney v. Niagara Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 778 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. Div. 2004);
Carney v. Davignon, 735 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (App. Div. 2001).
40. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 261, 310
(David Wootton ed., Hackett 2003) (1690).
41. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (“[A]s a practical matter,
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” (quoting Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))).
Though rules are crucial for the successful execution of an election, they are not definitional
in the same way as they are, say, in sport. A game of baseball is a game of baseball and not
a game of lacrosse or dodgeball or cricket or jai alai because of its rules. In contrast, and as
fifty states’ varying election procedures confirm, the essential character of an election is not
defined by the procedures put in place. Election procedures are merely safeguards to make
possible the equitable determination of the eligible community’s preferences; they are means,
not ends. 
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Consider, for example, just some of the regulations affecting a
would-be absentee vote in California: officials must prepare a
specific application form, with particular notices and particular
requests for information;42 the voter must complete the application
with specified information in specified locations on the specified
form;43 the voter must ensure that the application is received by
specified officials within a designated period;44 officials must process
the application according to specific criteria;45 officials must prepare
the actual ballots, with specified notices and instructions;46 officials
must deliver the appropriate absentee ballot, enclosure envelope,
and ballot pamphlet to the voter at a specified address within a
designated period;47 the voter must complete the enclosure envelope,
with specified information in specified locations;48 the voter must
complete the absentee ballot itself;49 the voter must enclose the
absentee ballot in the proper manner within the enclosure enve-
lope;50 the voter must ensure that the ballot and envelope are
delivered by specified means to specified officials within a desig-
nated period;51 officials must compare information on the envelope
with information on other election records in a specified manner;52
and officials must transmit the envelopes to the entity responsible
for counting ballots within a specific time frame.53 My point is not
that these regulations are undue or onerous, but rather that the
42. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3006, 3007.5 (West 2012).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 3001.
45. Id. §§ 3009, 3013.
46. Id. § 3011.
47. Id. §§ 3009, 3010, 3023.
48. Id. § 3011.
49. Id. § 3017.
50. Id. § 3011.
51. Id. § 3017.
52. Id. § 3019.
53. Id. §§ 14420, 15101.
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regulations are plentiful.54 This, in turn, breeds plentiful opportuni-
ties for error.
Some departures from the prescribed procedures may be the
result of attempts to manipulate the system—intentional cheating
by those who believe that violating the procedures is more likely to
lead to their desired outcome. Some departures may be the result of
misunderstanding or mistake by voters or officials who are not
familiar with each element of the rules, or who, pressed for time,
inaccurately complete a procedure. Whatever the cause, errors are
inevitable. And that leaves the problem of what to do when they
occur.
A. The Democratic Function of an Election
Acknowledging the imperfection of human endeavor, an election
system needs some decision rule to determine the extent to which
deviations from the procedural ideal should be accommodated. Such
a rule should be grounded in the rationales for holding elections as
an initial matter. Thus, before discussing the candidates for a rule
resolving election errors, it is useful to review exactly what it is that
we as a society seek to accomplish through the election process.
First and foremost, the purpose of an election is to allow a com-
munity to approve particular individuals to represent and govern
the community and, when repeated, to ensure that those chosen are
responsive to the community’s wishes. In this sense, the point of an
election is to produce an agreed-upon winner or set of winners. An
identified winner, however, does not alone suffice; otherwise, we
could toss coins or roll dice to determine our representatives.55
Instead, we expect the winner of an election to accurately represent,
54. Indeed, in some states, the plentiful regulations may be difficult even for trained
officials to parse. See State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 900 N.E.2d 982, 991 (Ohio 2008) (“[O]ur
analysis of the pertinent [election] statutes again reveals that they present a quagmire of
intricate and imprecisely stated requirements, including internal inconsistencies and multiple
affirmations and declinations, some of which even the parties appear to confuse in their
respective merit briefs.”).
55. Indeed, sortition—the selection of governing bodies by random lot—has a rich history
of discussion as an alternative to elections, dating back to ancient Athens. See, e.g., Oliver
Dowlen, Sorting Out Sortition: A Perspective on the Random Selection of Political Officers, 57
POL. STUD. 298, 298 (2009); Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery
Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1290-91 (1984).
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as best we can ascertain, the collective leadership choice of the
polity. This, in turn, requires that an election aggregate the indi-
vidual preferences of those who comprise the community.56
However, choosing a winner—even choosing the “right” winner—
is not an election’s sole purpose. Modern survey science allows us to
poll a comparatively modest representative sample of the eligible
electorate to arrive at a statistically certain victor the vast majority
of the time; instead of holding an election for governor or senator,
we could simply ask several thousand randomly selected electors on
Election Day whom they preferred, and we would quite often be
confident that we could get the statewide answer precisely right.57
Yet even with full confidence that it would produce the correct re-
sult, a poll seems an unacceptable substitute for an election. This is
because elections fulfill an additional societal function: they allow
each eligible member of the community to participate in the act of
choosing a representative, and thereby not only foster the strength
of the community as a community,58 but also secure community
members’ consent to be governed.59 Indeed, as scholars have long
recognized, the expressive and participatory elements of an election
explain each citizen’s decision to cast a ballot far better than the
remote possibility that her ballot would change the final instrumen-
tal result.60 
56. As Professor Arrow demonstrated long ago, when there are more than two available
choices, no election system to aggregate individual preferences will always arrive at a
universally agreed-upon articulation of the collective choice of the polity. See KENNETH J.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 3 (2d ed. 1963). Put differently, the choice of
aggregation mechanism has the capacity to change the outcome identified as the collective
decision. See id. That said, each election system used in the United States represents at least
a defensible approach to obtaining a plausible articulation of the polity’s collective choice.
57. Cf., e.g., David Chaum, Random-Sample Elections, RS-ELECTIONS.COM, http://rs-
elections.com/Random-Sample%20Elections.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2012).
58. See Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV.
491, 512-13 (2000); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 368, 374,
376-77 (1993).
59. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed.”); LOCKE, supra note 40, at 309-11. 
60. See Morris P. Fiorina, The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects, 38
J. POL. 390, 393 (1976); Andrew Gelman et al., What Is the Probability Your Vote Will Make
a Difference?, ECON. INQUIRY (forthcoming), available at http://www.stat.columbia.edu/
~gelman/research/published/probdecisive2.pdf (calculating an American’s average chance at
casting the decisive vote in the 2008 presidential election at 1 in 60 million); Michael P.
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Elections as we know them also fulfill a third purpose: cost-
efficiency. If we wished to gather the preferences of the eligible
electorate while also ensuring an opportunity for each member of
the electorate to participate, we could send trusted government
teams to canvass the eligible electors one-by-one. The duration and
expense of such an enterprise, with safeguards for accuracy and the
prevention of coercion, would be significant. Elections, while costly,
are a comparatively efficient means to (theoretically) assess the pre-
ferences of the legitimate electorate while (theoretically) permitting
participation by all such electors. 
Thus, elections have at least three aims: to accurately select
community representatives by aggregating the preferences of the
eligible community members, to allow participation in that endeavor
by as many of the eligible members of the community as possible,
and to accomplish these two objectives in a cost-efficient manner.
When errors occur in the course of an election, a principle to address
those errors should track the reasons for holding the election in the
first instance. It should, that is, promote the most accurate assess-
ment of eligible community members’ preferences, with the broadest
participation by eligible members of the community, at the least
cost.
B. Decision Rules for Error
Unfortunately, the most straightforward decision rules for the
resolution of errors are also the least adequate under these con-
ditions. At one pole, for example, a decision rule might call for the
counting of every ballot for which it is possible to count a vote, no
matter how egregious the departure from prescribed regulations.
Such a rule would allow substantial cause to question the reliability
McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the Vanishing Voter, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963,
966, 968 (2001) (finding that turnout increases substantially in years with a presidential race,
precisely when the incremental probability of a determinative vote is least); William H. Riker
& Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 25 (1968). 
Moreover, courts have recognized these participatory values of the election process as
legally protected.  See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, No. 3:08cv709, 2009 WL 3350028,
at *9-10 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2009) (ordering the belated counting of unlawfully excluded ballots
despite the undisputed fact that they “will have no effect on the outcome of the November 4,
2008 federal election”).
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of the election’s aggregation of preferences—ballots would be
counted when cast by unknown individuals, from unknown ad-
dresses, which might or might not represent the lone votes of
eligible members of the community. Indeed, such a rule would call
for the counting of multiple ballots cast by the same individual or by
individuals who acknowledge that they are not within the contem-
plated jurisdiction. This is not a principle for resolving errors that
inspires confidence in the election results.
The converse rule is more often proposed, but just as flawed. This
rule permits zero tolerance for error, with no ballot counted upon
any departure from prescribed procedures. Such a leaden emphasis
on formalities would extend not only to errors like a voter’s failure
to register or indicate a choice of candidate on the ballot, but also to
voter errors like entering both a given name and surname in the
space designated for one or the other, and to official errors like
failing to initial an absentee ballot or hitting the wrong key in data
entry. Indeed, true zero tolerance suggests that, in the California
absentee ballot described above,61 the ballot should not be counted
if the election official failed to include a ballot pamphlet in the
mailing packet.62 Procedural violation, by any actor for any reason,
would lead inevitably and uniformly to default. This sort of hard
line fails for the same reason as its considerably softer counterpart
above: it does not inspire confidence in the election’s results. Given
the number of regulations and the number of minor violations of
those regulations that are inevitable in any large-scale election, a
true zero-tolerance rule would exclude too many ballots of eligible
electors to constitute a reliable representation of the community’s
aggregate preferences.
The prevailing method in practice is to muddle along under a
third approach, which neither courts nor commentators have recog-
nized as inadequate. This approach embraces the rough intuition
that some errors should not be “charged” to the voter in counting
her ballot.63 The states have developed different names for this
61. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53.
62. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3023 (West 2012).
63. Legislatures could clearly designate those regulations that require invalidation for any
error, or for a given category of defined errors, and those that do not. Perhaps none have done
so with sufficient precision. But even if it were possible to rely on a legislature to designate
the precise remedy for each and every deviation from the substantial regulatory structure
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concept. When state legislatures create such a rule, they usually do
so by statutory declarations that election regulations are to be
construed liberally in favor of the voter.64 When the judiciary
imposes such a rule in the absence of legislative guidance, they
usually frame the issue in terms of “substantial compliance” with
the election regulation in question, distinguishing between major
and minor errors.65 Professor Rick Hasen has identified this ap-
proach as the “Democracy Canon” of construction, in which ambigu-
ous statutes are to be construed in voter-friendly fashion.66
The central critique of such a decision rule is that there is little
to ground the rule beyond the preferences of the decision maker.
“Minor” errors are not self-defining, nor is “substantial” compliance
with a regulation. The words give no guidance to determine whether
failure to notarize an absentee ballot is a minor error or a major
one. The same is true for other errors: mistakenly writing today’s
date rather than one’s date of birth on a voter registration form, or
transposing two digits of a twenty-digit driver’s license number;
casting a ballot at a pollsite table next to the one representing the
precinct to which the voter is assigned; or missing the deadline to
register—or to vote—by a day, or an hour, or a minute. All are
errors. But no principle inherent in the concepts of “minor” error or
“substantial” compliance indicates when the error in question
crosses the line at which the error is to be regarded as particularly
consequential.67 As a result, judicial decisions to disregard error, or
to refuse to disregard error, appear dangerously ad hoc.68
required to run a reliable election, the legislature would still itself need a decision rule to
determine which regulations should result in precluding the counting of a valid ballot, and
which should not.
64. See, e.g., Hasen, Democracy Canon, supra note 9, at 71, 79-80 & nn.49-52.
65. See, e.g., id. at 85.
66. See id. at 71, 123. In addition to the jurisdictions that have turned to the Democracy
Canon as a rule of statutory construction without legislative prompting, Professor Hasen
notes at least twelve states that also seem to have built it into portions of their state code. Id.
at 79-80 & nn.49-52. 
67. See Edward B. Foley, Appendix: The Devilish Details of the Coleman-Franken Dispute
6 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
docs/foley-eljapp.pdf (“‘[S]ubstantial compliance,’ at least without some rigorous subsidiary
definition, is a vague and amorphous standard.”).
68. See, e.g., Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 869-71, 877-78 (Alaska 2010) (excusing
misspellings of a write-in candidate’s name, but refusing to excuse a failure to mark a box
next to the name of a write-in candidate); Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002, 1009, 1012 (Pa.
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Moreover, the magnitude of an error is unlikely to be the best
measure of whether that error is significant to the appropriate
resolution of an election. A tiny slip of the finger during data entry,
changing a birth year from 1987 to 1997, makes a twenty-five-year-
old look fifteen—and ineligible to vote. A big mistake, such as
leaving the date of birth entirely blank, yields a similar question
about eligibility. In this context, size really does not matter. 
Some jurisdictions and commentators have tacked on a principle
for resolving errors based on the fault of the offender.69 Errors that
are the voter’s “fault” become preclusive; those that are not are
forgiven, when it is possible to do so and still log a vote in favor of
an identified candidate. It should first be noted that such assess-
ments, when they occur, are fairly rudimentary, with little analysis
of comparative contribution to the error; after all, as with most
wrongs, rarely is one actor the exclusive causal agent.70 For ex-
ample, if the instructions on a form are ambiguous, and a voter
completes that form incorrectly, accurate allocation of fault for the
resulting error will be difficult at best.
Even if it were possible to assign blame clearly and cleanly to
either voter or nonvoter, as I have investigated elsewhere, “fault” is
Commw. Ct. 2002) (excusing misspellings of a write-in candidate’s name and attempts to
write a candidate’s name on the improper ballot line, but refusing to excuse a failure to mark
a box next to the name of a write-in candidate); see also Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 So. 2d 206,
216-18 (La. 2000) (reviewing past Louisiana decisions that were ostensibly issued under a
uniform “substantial compliance” standard but yielded wildly variant results).
69. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-1.5 (LexisNexis 2012) (counting flawed ballots, if
officials caused the errors); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 16-106(1) (McKinney 2010) (counting flawed
ballots of eligible voters, but only if officials caused the errors); Franken Appeal, 767 N.W.2d
453, 461-62 (Minn. 2009) (“Although we have used a substantial compliance standard to judge
errors by election officials, we have held voters strictly to statutory requirements.”); Master’s
Report—Conclusions of Law and Findings of Fact 8-9, Neil v. Howard (In re  Election Contest,
Dist. 48) (House of Representatives of the State of Tex. Feb. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/Neil_v_Howard/Master%27s%20Report.pdf (forgiving voter’s failure
to file form due to pollworker error); Edward B. Foley, The Provisional Ballots of Unregistered
Voters, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Apr. 5, 2005), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
comments/2005/050405.php (proposing a postelection evaluation of registration errors based
on fault); cf. Foley, supra note 67, at 6 (coining the term “constructive compliance” to
distinguish flaws based on official error from those based on voter error).
70. Nor are these decisions always entirely consistent about the degree to which fault will
render an error preclusive. See, e.g., Womack v. Foster, 8 S.W.3d 854, 868-69, 871 (Ark. 2000)
(excusing the omission of voter numbers on absentee ballots because of official mistake, but
refusing to excuse the omission of reasons for voting absentee on applications because of
official mistake).
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at best an imperfect decision rule for the resolution of most of these
errors.71 The frame of fault implies that voters should be punished
for errors for which they are primarily responsible, by refusing to
count their ballots.72 But for the many election errors reflecting mis-
take rather than malfeasance, such punishment seems out of place,
given the precepts on which punishment is normally justified.
For example, precluding the counting of a ballot cast by an eli-
gible elector has little retributive merit. An error in the completion
of a form or in the marking of a ballot delivers little psychic damage
to the body politic; there is correspondingly little retributive value
in punishing voters for mistakes they did not intend to commit.
Mistakes in complying with election regulation seem an unduly
slight target for social vengeance.73 
A more serious argument may be premised on use of “fault” as a
means to avoid externalization of the cost of a wrong. Election offi-
cials presumably rely on voter compliance with election regulations
in order to develop efficient protocols of their own. When a voter
errs, officials’ attempts to compensate for that error may incur
administrative costs; punishing that error by refusing to count the
associated ballot may be a means to avoid the extra cost. Indeed, it
71. See Justin Levitt, Fault and the Murkowski Voter: A Reply to Flanders, 28 ALASKA L.
REV. 39, 43-44 (2011).
72. Id. at 44.
73. This Article unabashedly adopts an inclusive vision of democracy, with a normative
emphasis on increased participation by eligible electors, and procedural regulation deployed
primarily to ensure that eligibility. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-6, at 3 (1993) (“It must be
remembered that the purpose of our election process is not to test the fortitude and
determination of the voter, but to discern the will of the majority.”). 
As Spencer Overton has chronicled, this is not the only possible vision; some believe that
procedural regulations fulfill the independent normative function of screening the electorate
for “merit” by weeding out electors who are unable to comply. See Spencer Overton, A Place
at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 476-79 & n.29
(2001). In this view, discounting the ballots of those who fail to comply with election
regulations is not an expression of social vengeance, but a related expression of the lesser
“worth” of those ballots. See id. at 479. See generally Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 159, 163-64 (2001) (questioning the denigration of procedural rules more likely
to disqualify “voters who are less informed and less conscientious about the voting process”);
Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter
Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370 (1991) (chronicling the use of
procedural requirements to promote voting by more educated and informed citizens and
discourage voting by others).
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may even be a sufficiently stark punishment to deter voter careless-
ness in general.
That said, the deterrent value of a “fault”-based approach to
election error can be easily overstated. The morass of election rules
breeds many opportunities for missteps. Before deciding to pay
more attention to any specific regulation, a voter must be able to
adequately assess her own capacity for error with respect to the
procedure in question. It is far from clear that voters are that self-
aware. Furthermore, in the event that an error does occur, the feed-
back mechanism in most jurisdictions is not sufficiently developed
to communicate to the errant voter—or voters generally—when the
mistake occurred. Many voters casting provisional or absentee
ballots do not know whether those ballots are counted; those who
are informed that their ballots have been rejected are rarely told the
underlying cause with any specificity.74 If voters do not understand
the circumstances in which errors are likely to occur, it will be
difficult to deter mistakes, no matter how stark the punishment. 
Without the systemic impact of an effective deterrent, it is not
clear that the use of “fault” as a premise for determining the conse-
quence of error actually avoids substantial cost. Once an error has
occurred, if that error is to be disregarded only if the voter is not
primarily at fault, some procedure is needed to ascertain the proper
allocation of blame. Such a fact-finding procedure will inevitably
entail incremental cost. 
For example, consider a photo-finish election in which hundreds
or thousands of provisional ballots have been cast.75 Somewhere
along the way, errors led to these provisional ballots: perhaps a
voter registered improperly, or perhaps an official improperly pro-
cessed an accurate registration form; perhaps a voter arrived at the
74. For example, over half of the provisional ballots rejected in 2008 were reported as
rejected because the voter was not validly registered within the state. See U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2008 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY 51 (2009),
available at http://bit.ly/NwMDiC. Assume that such a voter made what she thought was an
attempt to register. Even if she comes to understand that her ballot was rejected, and even
if she comes to understand that her ballot was rejected because of a registration problem, it
is not clear whether she will understand why her attempt to register was not successful, with
sufficient specificity to avoid similar problems in the future. 
75. Provisional ballots, required by federal law in every state without Election Day
registration, are ballots that officials must offer to a voter whenever a dispute concerning that
voter’s eligibility exists. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2006).
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wrong precinct, or perhaps an official failed to locate the voter in the
correct pollbook; perhaps a voter failed to respond adequately to a
legitimate challenge of her qualifications, or perhaps her qualifica-
tions were improperly challenged. The source of the error is rarely
immediately apparent. In order to determine which ballots may be
counted in a fault-based regime, records and recollections will have
to be reviewed in order to properly apportion fault. This review is
not cost-free.76 And even if impeccably conducted, it still leads to the
discarding of a substantial number of ballots cast by voters who are
actually eligible to vote, who submitted their materials in timely
fashion, and who will not understand how to avoid the same
problems—or new ones—in subsequent elections. This Article sug-
gests that those resources might be better spent. 
When election errors inevitably occur, rather than focusing on the
magnitude of the error or the blameworthiness of the perpetrator,
I suggest a different guidestar: materiality. In some respects, this
is a simple, almost tautological, proposition: an election error should
only matter if it makes a difference in achieving an election’s
primary purposes. Yet this is not the principle currently driving the
resolution of most election errors. The discussion below represents
the first extended discussion of materiality in the election context.
As it shows, materiality is a principle better suited to resolving
inevitable errors than the available alternatives. Indeed, given the
opportunity to reevaluate materiality as an election progresses, the
concept may have even more utility in the election context than in
other legal arenas.
76. Indeed, such a review may be quite expensive.  See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd.
of Elections, 850 F. Supp. 2d 795, 823-30, 833 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (describing the extended
process of reviewing errors to attempt to allocate fault, including more than four hundred
subpoenas, eight hundred questionnaires, and a three-week hearing, that finally resolved a
juvenile court judicial race more than fourteen months after Election Day).
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III. THE MATERIALITY PRINCIPLE
A. Materiality in Other Contexts
“Materiality” can be a protean concept. But in developing an
operational understanding of materiality as applied to election
errors, it is not necessary to start from scratch. The concept has
been developed as an important principle in many areas, including
the law of contract,77 tortious78 and criminal fraud,79 securities
transactions,80 prosecutorial conduct,81 legal ethics,82 employment
discrimination,83 and civil procedure.84 It is possible to distill from
77. Materiality has at least three applications in contract law. First, among merchants,
the outcome of a “battle of the forms” depends on materiality: proposed alterations of terms
in an acceptance to an offer will not be considered part of the generated contract if they
“materially alter” the offer itself. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2002). Second, a misrepresentation in
the formation of a contract may render the contract voidable, but only if the misrepresentation
is material. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981). Third, the materiality of
a breach of contract determines remedies available to the party on the breach’s receiving end:
a material breach allows the offended party to suspend its own performance and seek
rescission of the contract, whereas an immaterial breach allows only an action for damages
without excusing the offended party’s own performance of contract obligations. 23 RICHARD
A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63.3 (4th ed. 1990).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1) (1977) (“Reliance upon a fraudulent
misrepresentation is not justifiable unless the matter misrepresented is material.”).
79. Federal criminal liability for fraud, and for many false statements under oath or to
federal government officials, attaches only if the falsification regards a material fact. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20-25 (1999); United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995).
80. In securities law, several related regulations amount to a requirement that regulated
entities accurately and publicly disclose any fact that is material. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(j), (l),
78n(e), 7241(a) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14a-9, 243.100(a) (2011). 
81. A prosecutor has a constitutional obligation to disclose to a defendant all evidence that
is material to either guilt or punishment. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009); Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
82. An attorney has a duty to report potential malpractice to her client, but only if the
mistake in question is material. Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer’s Duty to Inform His Client
of His Own Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 195 (2009). 
83. An employer’s adverse action against an employee must be material in order to be
actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 75-76 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing that
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), established a materiality test,
albeit using a different term).
84. A court may not grant summary judgment if there is a genuine dispute over a material
fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
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examinations of materiality in these other contexts a few common
principles—an exercise that I believe to be the first attempt of its
kind. Together, these principles can provide guidance for our voting
inquiry. 
First, materiality is used as a gauge for the legal significance of
an action or piece of information, often a mistake or misdeed. If the
action or information is material, certain legal consequences follow;
if not, the legal consequences are different. Materiality is thus a
toggle switch rather than a spectrum: the question is not whether
the item considered is more material or less material, but instead
whether it has reached a threshold level of significance, at which
point a categorical change in the legal nature of the action or
information is triggered. 
Second, materiality has a referent. An action or piece of informa-
tion evaluated for materiality is material or immaterial to a
particular decision, such as a decision to make a purchase,85 perform
a service,86 or deliver a verdict.87 As such, materiality cannot be
evaluated in the abstract; that which is material for some decisions
may be wholly immaterial for others. Courts and scholars agree that
this renders the materiality threshold heavily context- and fact-
dependent.88
Third, materiality has an object: a particular fact, a particular
statement, a particular action, or a particular change. It is impor-
tant to keep the discussion of materiality anchored to the particular
act or item for which materiality is at issue. In the contractual
context, for example, the obligations of a contract between mer-
85. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32, 234 (1988) (decision to purchase
a regulated security); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2002) (decision to purchase goods).
86. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981) (decision to enter a
contract for services).
87. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (decision to render a civil verdict); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J.) (decision to render a
criminal verdict).
88. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (“Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence
as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must
necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.”); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699,
702 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (“Materiality [in the false statement context] must be judged by the facts
and circumstances in the particular case.”); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed.
Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (Aug. 19, 1999) (“[M]agnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of
the item and the circumstances in which the judgment has to be made, will not generally be
a sufficient basis for a materiality judgment [regarding accounting misstatements].”).
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chants will turn upon whether there has been a material alteration
to an offer: that is, whether an alteration that has not expressly
been accepted creates a legally recognized change to the offer as a
whole.89 This requires two analyses: whether the term being altered
is a material term, and whether the nature of the alteration to that
term is material.90 Neither an insignificant change to an otherwise
material term, nor a significant change to an immaterial term, will
materially alter the offer as a whole.
Fourth, that which is material has probative weight and conse-
quence for the decision in question, beyond mere relevance. Exactly
how much consequence the material element must have is a
particularly thorny question, and there is little transsubstantive
scholarship examining the nature of the significance that an action
or piece of information must have before it becomes material. Yet a
review of the various substantive silos above indicates a rough
consensus. That which is material is not merely pertinent to a
decision, but has the realistic potential to influence or affect—that
is, change91—the decision at issue.92 It is not necessary to establish
“but for” causation to establish materiality; no legal doctrine
requires proof that a reasonable decision maker would select a
different course absent the action or information to be evaluated for
materiality.93 It is necessary, however, to find at least a substantial
question as to whether the reasonable decision maker would do so.94 
89. See U.C.C. § 2-207. 
90. See id.
91. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 899 (4th ed. 2000)
(defining “influence,” inter alia, as both “sway” and “modify”); id. at 28 (defining “affect,” inter
alia, as “[t]o ... effect a change in”).
92. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) (defining a fact as material if
it is “predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official
decision”). Courts have utilized the Kungys standard in a variety of contexts referring to
materiality. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (criminally false
statements generally); Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (3d Cir. 1997)
(ERISA disclosure); Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp.
2d 1233, 1268 (D. Or. 2008) (designation as a terrorist organization).
93. See, e.g., Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771 (rejecting a test of materiality examining whether
a decision would have been different absent a misrepresentation); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (same).
94. There is a substantial debate, beyond the scope of this Article, about the extent to
which a determination of materiality should account for a particular decision maker’s
individual characteristics in allocating responsibility for alleged misconduct between private
individuals. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 78-79 (2006)
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Thus, a disputed fact is material for purposes of summary
judgment only if the fact in question “might affect the outcome of
the suit.”95 In securities law, information is material, and therefore
subject to accurate and public disclosure, “if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it impor-
tant in deciding how to vote,” or that a “reasonable investor” would
consider it important in making an investment decision96—that is,
that the information would “have a significant propensity to affect
the voting [or investment] process.”97 A false statement to a govern-
ment official is material if it has “a natural tendency to influence,
or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking
body to which it [is] addressed.”98 Evidence relating to a defendant’s
guilt or punishment is constitutionally material when “there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”99 In each of
these areas, and others, materiality distinguishes actions or infor-
mation that reasonably call a given decision into substantial
question from those that do not.
Finally, and central to this Article, there have been a few fleeting
discussions acknowledging that the materiality of an action or piece
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). In the voting context, the relevant decision maker is
an election official. The law tends to avoid ascribing legal significance to individual variations
among state actors when assessing the reasonableness of government decisions. 
95. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
96. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32, 234
(1988). 
97. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970)); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32, 234; SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (“The omission or misstatement
of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the
magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person
relying upon the report would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction
of the item.”).
98. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (quoting Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770)
(internal quotation marks omitted). More generally, a fraudulent misrepresentation “is
material if a reasonable man would attach importance to [the misrepresented fact’s] existence
or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977). In the formation of a contract, the
misrepresentation of a fact is considered material “if it would be likely to induce a reasonable
person to manifest his assent”—that is, if it is likely to cause a person to enter a contract
when she might not otherwise do so. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981). 
99. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682 (1985) (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J.)).
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of information can change over time. In these other disciplines,
actions or pieces of information that are initially immaterial may
become material at some later point, based on their aggregate
significance or a changed context. For example, in evaluating legal
malpractice, a mistake may appear at first to be immaterial, with
negligible impact on the client; if contextual factors change, how-
ever, the consequences may develop such that the initial error later
becomes material.100 Similarly, a financial misstatement that is
immaterial on its own may become material when aggregated with
other misstatements.101 In the voting context, as described more
fully in Part III.B.3, the significance of this facet of materiality
operates in the opposite direction: errors that once were material
may become immaterial at a later point.
B. The Meaning of Materiality in the Election Context
The principles above are helpful in distilling a sophisticated
understanding of materiality. This Section applies the above tax-
onomy to election-related errors.
The translation of the first principle above is straightforward:
materiality becomes a toggle switch for determining when an error
should prevent the counting of an otherwise valid vote. If an error
is material, the associated ballot should not be counted. If, instead,
an error is immaterial, it should not cause disenfranchisement. 
The second principle above is also relatively straightforward to
apply in the election arena. Facts or objects are material to particu-
lar decisions. In the election context, as discussed above, the pri-
mary purpose of the enterprise is to discern the political preference
100. Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) Seriously,
42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 791 (2008).
101. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,153 (Aug. 19, 1999)
(“Matters ... could potentially cause future financial statements to be materially misstated,
even though the auditor has concluded that the adjustments are not material to the current
financial statements. This may be particularly the case where immaterial misstatements
recur in several years and the cumulative effect becomes material in the current year.”
(citation omitted)). Or, conversely, inside information about a proposal never consummated
may be material when the proposal is made but may lose its impact over time. See Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for
Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1206-08 (2003).
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of eligible members of the political community.102 The materiality
inquiry takes its lead from the same mandate, with two potential
referents. First, error generally should be evaluated to determine
whether it is material to ensuring that a ballot is cast by an elector
who is eligible; second, error on a ballot itself should be evaluated
to determine whether it is material to determining the preference
of the elector. 
The third principle counsels attention to the particular object of
the materiality inquiry. The superficial answer, evident from the
discussion above, is that the materiality of an error should be the
touchstone. But as in contract law, this is usefully separated into
two analyses: whether the underlying regulatory provision that has
been violated is material, and whether the error or omission itself
is material.103 Neither an insignificant error in an otherwise
material regulation nor a significant error in an immaterial
regulation should become a material error in the determination of
disenfranchisement.
1. Materiality of the Underlying Regulatory Provision
In identifying whether an error is material to determining a
would-be voter’s eligibility or political preference, the first inquiry
is therefore to assess whether the underlying regulatory request or
command is material to determining the voter’s eligibility or elec-
toral preference. If the underlying regulation is immaterial, then a
flaw in that information must also be immaterial, no matter how
substantial the flaw. 
In some cases, this inquiry is trivial. For example, if the underly-
ing regulation is irrelevant to determining the voter’s qualifications,
it cannot be material in that inquiry. Consider a voter who refuses
to provide her race on a voter registration form.104 The voter’s race
—the underlying information sought—is irrelevant to her qualifi-
cations to vote. A fortiori, the underlying information must be
immaterial to an eligibility inquiry. And a fortiori, any perceived
102. Supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
103. See supra text accompanying note 90.
104. See, e.g., Op. Ga. Attorney Gen. No. 95-35 (Aug. 4, 1995), available at http://law.ga.gov/
opinion/95-35.
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flaw in the voter’s answer to that immaterial question must itself
be immaterial. 
In other circumstances, the underlying information will be
relevant to a final decision but not necessarily material. A piece of
information is relevant if it has even an iota of use in determining
a voter’s qualifications or deciphering the voter’s intended candi-
date.105 A voter’s telephone number, for example, may be relevant to
the determination of her eligibility because it allows an election
official to contact the voter directly to ask probative questions;
moreover, the number’s area code and exchange may increase or
decrease the chance that a voter lives in the appropriate district.
However, though a voter’s telephone number may be relevant to
determining her qualifications, it is not, on its own, material to that
determination. As discussed in the fourth principle above, material-
ity demands more significance.106 That which is material influences
a reasonable decision maker’s decision. It need not alone be outcome
determinative, but it must have at least enough probative weight to
create substantial doubt or uncertainty about the outcome. If the
other information on a registration form indicated eligibility, a flaw
in a telephone number would not cause a reasonable registrar to
substantially question whether the voter in question was eligible to
vote.
2. Materiality of the Error Itself
Thus, in applying the materiality principle developed in this
Article, decision makers faced with flawed performance in the
execution of an election requirement must first determine whether
the underlying regulatory objective is material. At this point,
however, the analysis is at most halfway complete. There remains
the materiality of the error itself. That is, one must determine
whether the error in question raises a substantial question for a
reasonable decision maker about the voter’s eligibility or ballot
choice. 
105. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a
[consequential] fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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Several types of errors may be presumptively immaterial. For
example, an error may exist in the form of the information con-
veyed, even when the substance of the information conveyed is clear
and unambiguous. Consider a voter registration form requiring the
voter’s date of birth, XX/XX/XXXX. The regulation exists to extract
the voter’s age, which is unquestionably material: a voter’s age is a
substantive element of qualification to vote in every state in the
country. Yet the materiality of the underlying information does not
automatically render material any flaw in the expression of that
information. Writing “November” instead of “11” as the month of
birth, even when “11” is clearly called for, is not an error that is
material to determining whether the voter is of lawful voting age.
As such, it should not serve as an error that enables disenfranchise-
ment. 
More controversially, and more contrary to current practice, the
same principle applies if a voter marks a candidate’s circle on a
ballot with an unambiguous check mark when the regulation calls
for the voter to fill in the circle, or if a voter both fills in a candi-
date’s circle and unlawfully writes the same candidate’s name in the
space for a write-in choice. There are certainly circumstances when
the improper form of information may in fact create doubt about the
substance it intends to convey; for example, if instructions require
checking an adjacent box to vote for a candidate, marking an “X”
over Candidate Smith’s name may not indicate whether the voter
intended to vote for Smith or convey her displeasure with Smith.
That error would be material. But when the information’s form
alone is at error, and that flaw does not create substantial doubt or
uncertainty about the qualifications of the affected voter or her
intended preference, the flaw is immaterial. 
An error may also be immaterial if information material to a
voter’s qualifications or preference does not appear in a particular
designated location, even though the information is unambiguously
provided elsewhere to the same regulatory actor. For example, a
voter who presents the last four digits of her Social Security number
in the voter registration form’s box designated for her birthdate and
presents her birthdate in the Social Security number box has erred
—twice. But as long as the information conveyed is unambiguous,
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neither error casts her eligibility in doubt. Both should therefore be
regarded as immaterial.
These are not the only types of immaterial errors. Consider the
electors whom Waller County refused to register in 2008 because
they failed to provide ZIP codes on their registration forms.107 As
long as the voter provides a street address and city indicating that
she lives in a particular location, the lack of a ZIP code does not cast
into doubt her qualifications to vote for the candidates running for
office in her precinct. No reasonable decision maker would believe
that error alone to be material to eligibility.
The ZIP code example above reflects that in election law, as else-
where, materiality must be evaluated in the context of other infor-
mation available to the decision maker.108 Indeed, this principle is
not limited to the information on a given form. I suggest that the
materiality of a flaw can and should rely on other reliable contex-
tual information readily available to election officials. Such an
approach contributes to ensuring that voting regulations focus on
substantive qualifications and actual voter intent, rather than pro-
cedural hiccups. Consider a seventy-five-year-old elector, physically
appearing before an official, with no doubt about her identity. If she
mistakenly offers the current date instead of her birthday on a voter
registration form, her form will contain a substantial error. The
unambiguous visual evidence, however, renders that error immate-
rial in assessing her qualifications. Reliable evidence that a flaw is
immaterial can come from sources other than the immediate vicinity
of the flaw itself.
The question of the extent to which context may be considered, of
course, is different from the question of a duty to seek that informa-
tion out. Recognizing that information available to election officials
beyond the four corners of a form may render a flaw on that form
immaterial does not itself imply the existence of an affirmative duty
to seek or elicit the curative information in question. Such a duty
might well involve substantial incremental cost and is not necessary
to the argument advanced here. My argument on the contextual
nature of materiality demands only that when curative information
has been presented, an official may not ignore the information that
107. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
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resolves a pending question simply by asserting that her evaluation
of materiality is confined to the source of the error itself.
3. The Dynamic Reassessment of Materiality
That realization, in turn, leads to the insight at the heart of this
Article: a determination about the materiality of an election error
can and should rely on information that becomes available to
government actors at different points in time. Thus far, this Article
has addressed only errors for which materiality is a known quantity
at the time the error is committed. Even with this limitation of the
principle, materiality would still be a superior basis for resolving
election errors than the available alternatives—more votes would be
counted when the eligibility of the elector and her intended can-
didates were not in doubt, with limited incremental cost for the
decision maker. But the materiality principle begins to bear far
more serious fruit with the insight that it is dynamic.
The evaluation of the materiality of an election error—at least
with respect to a voter’s qualifications—should not be confined to
the initial appearance of the error in question. At the moment the
error is first evaluated, it is material if it creates real and reason-
able doubt as to whether the individual in question is qualified. But
that which is immaterial at time t—say, a voter’s omission of his
apartment number on his registration form, which does not create
any doubt about his residency in a particular precinct—may become
material at time t + 1, if there later arises reliable evidence calling
into question whether he lives in his apartment building at all.109
Conversely, that which is material at time t—say, a voter’s failure
to affirm his citizenship on his registration form—may become
immaterial at time t + 1 if it later becomes clear that the voter is a
109. There are few practical applications of the progression from immaterial to material
mistake in the election context. At virtually any point in an election cycle before a regular
ballot is cast or an absentee or provisional ballot is separated from its ballot envelope, if a
substantial question concerning an individual’s eligibility arises, election officials (and often
private actors) have multiple procedural means to challenge that voter’s status and prevent
the vote from counting if the voter is in fact ineligible. There will usually be no incremental
benefit, at that point, in relying on the materiality principle to resurrect a past error that has
become material as the reason to block the vote, because the information giving rise to the
change in materiality will itself suffice as independent cause.
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citizen. At the time when there is no longer a doubt about the
individual’s qualifications, the earlier error becomes immaterial. In
this Article, I suggest that the original error should therefore not
provide cause to deprive the individual newly known to be eligible
of her valid vote.
Some applications of this concept, though not identified as such,
are readily observable in current practice. The easiest such example
is an election official’s discovery of a mistake. If a data entry clerk
hits an errant key while typing a registrant’s personal information
into a computerized registration system, that keystroke becomes an
error in the individual’s record. That error may lead to legitimate
questions about, for instance, the individual’s true identity. The
instant that the error is discovered as such, however, it becomes
instantly immaterial, because the individual’s qualifications are no
longer in doubt. The same is true if the error was caused by the
applicant instead of an election official; once the error is discovered
as an error, and reliable and accurate information is provided
instead, the original flaw is no longer material to determining the
voter’s qualifications.
The example above depends on the direct correction of flawed
information. Errors may also be rendered immaterial by new
information resolving eligibility questions raised by an original flaw. 
Such an example can also be found in current practice, though it
is a bit more difficult to spot. The Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) was a wide-ranging piece of federal legislation.110 One of its
provisions requires voters with a current and valid driver’s license
to provide that license number on their voter registration form, and
requires other voters to provide the last four digits of their Social
Security number if they have one.111 That number, and the voter’s
name and date of birth, are compared to motor vehicle or Social
Security records.112 For certain voters—those who are registering by
mail and have not yet voted in the state—the comparison becomes
part of an identity verification requirement: either the information
must match, or the voter must show one of several enumerated
110. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in 42
U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2006)).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i) (2006).
112. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(B).
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forms of documentary identification, before the voter may vote a
regular ballot.113
In this Article’s parlance, the HAVA provision establishes a
regime to test voter qualifications in a manner acknowledging that
the materiality of a piece of information may vary over time. HAVA
requires states to test the identity of new voters registering by
mail.114 It establishes one means to do so by demanding that states
ask for information—the driver’s license number or Social Security
digits—used to probe such applicants’ identities. If the information
on the registration form matches information held in the records of
government databases, the applicant’s identity is confirmed.115
However, if an error on the registration form or in a corresponding
government database record causes a mismatch, the individual’s
identity could be called into question. 
At that moment, time t, with the error in the record undiscovered,
the mismatch is certainly relevant, and perhaps material,116 to
113. Id. § 15483(b). For a general explanation of the matching regime, see Nathan
Cemenska, HAVA’s Matching/ID Requirement: A Meaningless Tale Told By ... Congress, 12
RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 27 (2008).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b).
115. Id. § 15483(b)(3)(B).
116. Evidence from challenges to state laws implementing variants of this HAVA provision
has revealed that approximately 20-30 percent of registration forms initially fail to match
corresponding records in motor vehicle or Social Security systems, largely because of
typographical errors and other inconsequential inconsistencies between databases, although
the error rate can be reduced with sustained and focused attention by officials to the issue.
Brief of Appellees at 12, Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning (Browning I), 522
F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-15932); see also Fla. State Conference of NAACP v.
Browning (Browning II), 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1243-45 (N.D. Fla. 2008); Supplemental
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4-5,
Browning II, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (No. 4:07-cv-402) (Doc. 135); SARAH WHITT, WIS. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY BD., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF HAVA CHECKS IN WISCONSIN at ii, 4 (Jan.
15, 2009), http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=15857&locid=47. 
It is intriguing to contemplate the impact of this known error rate on the materiality of a
mismatch to a voter’s qualifications. Existing quantitative evidence has shown that most
attempts to match succeed. See Ian Urbina, States’ Actions to Block Voters Appear Illegal, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2008), tbl., http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/09voting_
states.pdf. Existing quantitative evidence has also shown that a substantial number of
attempts to match fail because of inconsequential errors like typos. See, e.g., Brief of
Appellees, supra, at 10-11, 42. There is no rigorous quantitative evidence to indicate how
many of the failed match attempts are due to inconsequential errors and how many actually
indicate ineligibility, though some election officials have acknowledged that “most” failed
matches are due to typographical errors or errors in the matching process. See Fourth
Declaration of Glenn T. Burhans, Jr., in Support of Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum
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determining the voter’s qualifications. Yet HAVA does not contem-
plate rejecting outright registration forms with a mismatch. Instead,
it allows mismatched voters to show a piece of documentary
identification, at time t + 1, up to and including at the polls.117 Once
the voter provides her documentary identification, her identity is no
longer in doubt. And because the original error in the mismatch,
whatever its source, has become immaterial to determining her
qualifications, it no longer interferes with the vote: the voter may
vote a regular ballot, like all other eligible and registered electors.
Although both of the examples above are drawn from existing
practice, the dynamic nature of the materiality decision has never
before been articulated as such in the election context. Indeed,
present standard operating procedure is to assess election errors
only when they occur, ignoring the potential to reassess with more
complete information. For example, once an error has occurred in
voter registration, or in the absentee balloting process, that error in
practice normally proves determinative for the entire election cycle. 
This is a lost opportunity. Indeed, the case for the dynamic as-
sessment of materiality is substantially stronger in the election
context than in most other legal arenas. In these other environ-
ments, the materiality inquiry usually involves a retroactive count-
erfactual: a hypothetical ex post look at whether a decision maker
might have acted differently had a prior action or piece of infor-
mation been different.118 The materiality of misinformation in, or
information omitted from, a securities disclosure, for example, is
of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at Exhibit 15, Browning
II, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (No. 4:07-cv-402) (Doc. 147).
Even if “most” of the failed matches are caused by errors rather than ineligible voters, a
mismatch is certainly relevant to the determination of eligibility. It is less clear, however,
given the context of the known error rate, whether a mismatch should be material—that is,
whether a mismatch should cause a reasonable decision maker to substantially question a
voter’s qualifications. There is no ready guide, at present, for determining when certain
categories of information are sufficiently unreliable that they should not have the realistic
potential to influence a reasonable decision maker. 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i).
118. In the most common legal counterfactual inquiry, the investigation into causation, the
question usually concerns “but for” cause: for example, whether a decision maker would have
acted differently with different stimuli. See Robert N. Strassfeld, If ... : Counterfactuals in the
Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 345-46 (1992). The materiality counterfactual is a milder
version of the same: whether a decision maker might have acted differently with different
stimuli.
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often gauged after financial damage has been done; the question is
whether different disclosure might have caused an investor or
potential investor to act differently.119 Similarly, the materiality of
other wrongful disclosures or failures to disclose—false statements,
prosecutorial evidence, tortious misrepresentations—usually de-
pends on a retroactive counterfactual.120 Because the relevant
decision point has already passed, the utility in allowing materiality
to change over time in these circumstances is confined to gauging
the magnitude of remedial and/or retributive liability.121 
This is not so in the election context, in which an initial evalua-
tion of materiality usually occurs before the ultimate decision point.
The decision impacted by the materiality of an error on most re-
quired election records is a decision about the eligibility of a would-
be voter. The ultimate decision on that issue can usually be either
deferred or repeatedly reevaluated, until the vote is certified. 
Consider an error on a voter registration form. When the form is
submitted, the election official must assess whether that error is
material: given the form as submitted, he must ask whether a
reasonable decision maker would have a significant question about
the would-be voter’s substantive qualifications. For some errors, the
answer will be yes; for others, it will be no. 
119. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 77-79, 81 and accompanying text.
121. There may still be substantial utility in allowing materiality to change over time in
these contexts, within the liability inquiry. Consider the same securities disclosure discussed
in the text. An omitted disclosure may be wholly immaterial at time t, when it is first excluded
from a financial report. It may then become material at time t + 1, when external
circumstances change so as to render the omission likely to impact an investment decision.
The decision to invest or not to invest may occur at time t + 2. Thereafter, once it is clear that
damage has occurred, a fact-finder must evaluate materiality retroactively, looking back to
t + 2 to determine whether the omitted disclosure was material then. It will still be useful, in
this context, to recognize that the materiality of the omitted disclosure may change, from time
t to time t + 2. 
The observation that materiality may change over time does not lead inexorably to one
normative conclusion about whether the law should recognize a change in materiality in these
other contexts. In the example of securities disclosures, for instance, the decision to fix the
materiality of a misrepresentation at the time that it is made, or the decision to allow the
materiality of the misrepresentation to change over time, will tend to shift the costs of the
misrepresentation onto the reporting entity or onto the consumer, depending on whether
misrepresentations are more likely to move from material to immaterial, or vice versa. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to present either an empirical or normative assessment of
these costs.
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In an election cycle, these need not be the final answers. There
will be multiple opportunities to reassess the materiality of that
error in context, as other information comes to officials’ attention.
Perhaps the voter later contacts a registrar with additional curative
information. Perhaps the error is uncorrected until Election Day,
when the voter is able to submit a segregated provisional ballot with
additional curative information. Or perhaps she is summoned before
a court overseeing a postelection proceeding. All of these represent
opportunities to collect additional information and to reassess the
materiality of the registration form’s original error. Only the fact
that the materiality of the error may change over time gives full
effect to these multiple decision points. The dynamic reassessment
of materiality converts the inquiry from a focus on the accuracy of
the election official’s initial assessment and consequent assignment
of fault, to a focus on the substantive qualifications of the individual
in question. As discussed below, this latter focus better serves the
values of the voting process as a whole.
C. Implications of the Materiality Principle
Recognizing the dynamic nature of materiality, particularly for
questions involving a voter’s eligibility, would yield tangible con-
sequences for the election system. In this Section, I first give more
robust shape to the materiality principle by reviewing some of the
practical adjustments necessary to give it life in the election context.
I then explain the benefits and potential concerns of evaluating
—and reevaluating over time—election errors through the lens of
materiality.
1. Accommodating a Dynamic Assessment of Materiality
In practice, several aspects of the administrative process would
change if election errors were evaluated under a dynamic material-
ity principle. In pre-election and Election Day administration,
officials would favor procedures allowing them to reassess the mate-
riality of an error as available information changes. Such proce-
dures would preserve the flexibility of the decision process, avoiding
the conversion of early assessments into premature “final answers.” 
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Provisional ballots, for example, are an existing expression of this
principle that account fairly well for a limited set of errors. Consider
a voter at the polls whom the volunteer pollworker cannot readily
find in the precinct’s register of voters, often known as a pollbook.
Federal law provides that she should be offered a provisional
ballot.122 On election day, her provisional ballot is collected and
segregated, and later evaluated to determine whether she was
actually on the rolls when the ballot was cast.
If at the moment a voter presents herself to vote her name cannot
be found in the pollbook, all that is certain is that an error occurred.
At that moment, the error is material to determining whether the
voter is eligible, because a reasonable decision maker would find a
substantial question about the voter’s eligibility: she may not be a
resident of the jurisdiction, she may never have attempted to
register, or the registration may have been legitimately canceled.
Yet her valid registration may later be found, improperly purged or
entered with a typographical error making it difficult to find in the
pollbook. Allowing the voter to vote a provisional ballot at the polls
provides an opportunity to effectuate a valid vote if an error in the
precinct book appears material at the time but is later found to be
immaterial.
The existing provisional ballot regime in most states, however, is
insufficient to realize the potential of a dynamic assessment of
materiality in other circumstances. At present, an error in the
registration process is often frozen in place at the end of the
registration period. If the error is uncorrected at the end of the
registration period, the would-be voter’s application is rejected,
leaving her unregistered. This freeze has consequences down the
road. If the voter ventures to the polls, she will not be listed in the
pollbook; she may be given a provisional ballot, but state law rarely
allows such ballots to be counted, no matter what evidence of
eligibility the voter provides. Many states deem invalid a provi-
sional ballot cast by a voter whose earlier attempt to register has
been rejected.123
122. 42 U.S.C. § 15482.
123. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-584(E) (LexisNexis 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-
308(d)(2) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-8.5-106 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 101.048(2)(b)(2)
(2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-419(c)(3) (2011); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18A-15(b)(3)
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A different approach to errors in the registration process would
better permit a dynamic assessment of materiality, in which initial
errors may be resolved later. Some states perform data entry on
registration forms despite potential flaws and preserve those
records for future revision, often in some sort of “provisional” or
“pending” status.124 This practice permits the reevaluation of a
registrant’s eligibility in the event that material flaws become
immaterial at a later point.
In such a system, errors can be corrected based on new informa-
tion, whenever that information arrives. Consider our elector who
substitutes the current date for her birthdate on a registration
form.125 Her proper birthdate may become clear before the election,
on Election Day, or in some sort of postelection proceeding. Preserv-
ing the provisional status of the registration allows the earlier error
to be recognized as inconsequential whenever it becomes immaterial
in determining her eligibility. 
In this context, it is important to distinguish the voter’s legal
status under the materiality principle from administrative proce-
dures designed to facilitate the smooth conduct of the election. Just
as the obligation to accept corrective information when it is pre-
sented does not imply an obligation for officials to seek that
information out,126 so too the obligation to accept corrective informa-
tion does not imply an obligation to immediately reflect that new
status in every pre-election procedure. 
For example, voter registration is not only a means to test
eligibility but also a means to facilitate planning for Election Day.
Many states will use the rolls as they exist at the registration
deadline to print pollbooks of voters whose eligibility is unques-
tioned. If a voter presents information rendering a registration error
immaterial, but does so during a period that would interfere with
the printing of the pollbooks, there is no need driven by the
(LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-3 (LexisNexis 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:566.2(A) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 11-303(d)(4)(i) (LexisNexis 2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 168.813(1) (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.430(5)(1) (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3505.183(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012).
124. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-2-110(5)(b) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.107
(LexisNexis 2012).
125. See supra paragraph accompanying note 108.
126. See supra paragraph preceding Part III.B.3.
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materiality principle to reflect her updated status on the pollbooks
themselves. The important thing is that the change in the material-
ity of her registration error makes it possible for her to cast a ballot,
albeit a provisional ballot, that is legally valid and will be recog-
nized as such by the end of the election cycle. 
The absentee ballot system presents another opportunity for
application of the dynamic nature of materiality. Preserving ab-
sentee ballot materials for a limited period after Election Day would
allow jurisdictions to recognize changes in the materiality of errors
over time. If a jurisdiction preserves even ballot envelopes with
flaws that cast doubt on the voter’s qualifications, and information
rendering the flaws immaterial comes to light in a postelection
process, the absentee ballots within could be counted.
Absentee ballot applications present a more difficult problem.
While federal law requires that provisional ballots be provided to
every voter who arrives at the polls and claims to be eligible and
registered,127 absentee ballots are not usually delivered in response
to flawed applications. That is, in most circumstances, a flawed
application will end the absentee process, with no opportunity to
reflect the elector’s substantive preferences if the error is later
overcome.128 It should be possible, however, for jurisdictions to avoid
prematurely closing off the absentee process at the application
stage, if they wish to avoid disqualifying voters on the basis of flaws
that might later become immaterial. In the event of an absentee
ballot application with a flaw sufficient to call the voter’s qualifica-
tions into question, the equivalent of a provisional absentee ballot
might still be sent to the applicant to preserve that potential voter’s
preference. The return envelopes of such absentee ballots could be
clearly labeled and segregated when they arrive. They would remain
segregated until the original flaw is resolved or explained (and the
ballot is rendered valid), or the vote becomes final (with the ballot
still invalid), whichever comes first. Such a procedure would
preserve the ability to resolve uncertainties about eligibility until
the last possible decision point in the election.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a).
128. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-9-4(E), (F) (West 2012).
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2. Counting Votes Pursuant to the Materiality Principle
The changes above would preserve administrative flexibility to
evaluate and reevaluate the materiality of errors throughout the
election cycle. When errors are revealed to be immaterial, I argue
that the corresponding ballots should be counted. 
Using the materiality of errors as a standard for counting ballots
—even without a dynamic reassessment of that materiality—would
have significant consequences. For example, in the event of an error
on the ballot’s face, many jurisdictions now usually determine
whether that error is “technical” or “substantial.”129 Materiality
regularizes the inquiry. If the error renders the voter’s choice
ambiguous, the error would be material and the ballot invalid; if it
does not, the error would be immaterial and the ballot countable.
Similarly, an error on a prerequisite form, such as a registration
form, need not jeopardize the vote’s validity if that error is not
material in determining the voter’s eligibility to vote for the election
in question. The same would follow for a prerequisite procedure, like
the casting of a provisional ballot in the proper precinct. In each
case, by definition, the only votes to be counted are those for which
no reasonable decision maker would have a substantial question
about either the voter’s eligibility or the voter’s ballot preference.
Allowing for the dynamic reassessment of an error’s materiality
would have greater consequences still. In assessing the validity of
a provisional ballot, officials now normally compare the material
accompanying the provisional ballot to registration records.130 They
129. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(3) (2012) (“Substantial compliance with the
provisions or intent of this code shall be all that is required for the proper conduct of an
election to which this code applies.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3002(b)(1) (2012) (declaring that
no ballot shall be invalidated by any “technical” error); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.453(3) (2012)
(“The judges shall count votes marked substantially in accordance with [these rules] when the
intent of the voter seems clear.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.127(1)(c) (West 2011) (requiring
only substantial compliance with election regulations in the event of an outcome-
determinative dispute); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 65.009(a) (West 2011) (“Failure to mark a
ballot in strict conformity with this code does not invalidate the ballot.”); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20A-4-105(6)(b) (West 2012) (“The counters may not invalidate a ballot because of
mechanical and technical defects in voting or failure on the part of the voter to follow strictly
the rules for balloting.”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-6-5(g) (West 2012) (“Except as otherwise
specifically provided in this chapter, no ballot shall be rejected for any technical error which
does not make it impossible to determine the voter’s choice.”).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)(4).
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discern whether the voter in question was validly registered; if there
is a flaw in the registration, the officials may have to assess the
magnitude of the flaw or the party at fault for the flaw.131 Processing
an absentee ballot adds the extra step of assessing whether the
voter in question submitted a valid application, and is properly
identified as the applicant, by the relevant deadline; there too, in
the event of a flaw in the absentee procedures, officials may have to
assess the magnitude of the flaw or the party at fault for the flaw.132
A dynamic conception of materiality would, without adding to the
quantum of investigation, shift the focus of the relevant inquiries:
in the event of a flaw, officials would assess whether the other
information newly available renders that flaw immaterial. If a
reasonable decision maker would no longer question the voter’s
eligibility or ballot preference based on the original flaw, the vote
should be valid.
As above, counting votes pursuant to the materiality principle
need not involve substantial additional administrative burden. The
materiality principle does not demand incremental procedures to
seek information bearing on the validity of a vote; it merely changes
131. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(3) (2012) (“Substantial compliance with the
provisions or intent of this code shall be all that is required for the proper conduct of an
election to which this code applies.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.127(1)(c) (West 2011)
(requiring only substantial compliance with election regulations in the event of an outcome-
determinative dispute); Lanier v. Revell, 605 S.W.2d 821, 822-23 (Tenn. 1980) (distinguishing
between “major” and “minor” errors in the registration process); Emery v. Robertson Cnty.
Election Comm’n, 586 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tenn. 1979) (overlooking errors in registration
materials based on an official’s mistake); Alvarez v. Espinoza, 844 S.W.2d 238, 243 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992) (per curiam) (overlooking errors in registration procedures based on an official’s
mistake).
132. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3009(c) (West 2012) (allowing an absentee ballot to count
“[i]f the voter substantially complies” with official directions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(3)
(2011) (“Substantial compliance with the provisions or intent of this code shall be all that is
required for the proper conduct of an election to which this code applies.”); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 117.087(4) (West 2011) (establishing prima facie evidence that an absentee ballot will
count if the associated envelope “substantially compl[ies]” with the applicable statutes); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.127(1)(c) (West 2011) (requiring only substantial compliance with
election regulations in the event of an outcome-determinative dispute); Jones v. Jessup, 615
S.E.2d 529, 531 (Ga. 2005) (evaluating failure to sign an application for an absentee ballot,
failure to write place of birth, and incorrect substitution of the date of voting an absentee
ballot for a date of birth, for “substantial compliance” with the law); Foust v. May, 660 S.W.2d
487, 490 (Tenn. 1983) (refusing to invalidate absentee ballots due to a “technical omission, on
the part of the registrar”).
124 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:083
the standard by which votes are evaluated when there is cause to
undertake an evaluation. 
For example, consider one of the over three thousand jurisdictions
where votes are cast using optically scanned ballots, which function
much like the answer forms for standardized tests.133 Election
procedures often specify that a voter wishing to vote for a write-in
candidate must fill in an empty oval or box next to the line on which
the candidate’s name is to be written.134 These procedures help
ensure that the optical-scan ballot reader is able to flag ballots on
which there is a write-in vote, even if the system itself cannot
process the identity of the chosen candidate; without the filled-in
oval, normal tabulation procedures might not reveal the existence
of a write-in preference.135 Yet even without filling in the oval, a
voter who has accurately written in the name of a valid candi-
date—and only that name—for a given office has unambiguously
demonstrated the wish to vote for that individual. Such votes occur
relatively frequently.136 The materiality principle does not demand
that election officials undertake a special search for all such ballots
if those ballots would not otherwise be discovered in the normal
course. It merely requires that if the ballot is discovered, and a
question arises about whether that ballot represents a valid vote,
the vote be counted if the missing oval does not amount to a flaw
material in determining the voter’s preference.
133. Election Equipment 2012, VERIFIED VOTING FOUND., http://www.verifiedvoting
.org/verifier (last visited Sept. 26, 2012).
134. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.360(d)(2) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-480(b)(1) (2011);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 696(2)(D) (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.456.2(4)(a) (2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-15-206(5)(b) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-816(1) (2010); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 659:17(2) (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-49(A), (D) (West 2012); N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§ 7-106(5)(3), (7) (McKinney 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-106(5)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012);
see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15342(a) (West 2012), amended by 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 190
(A.B. 503) (West).
135. THERON JI ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF WRITE-IN MARKS ON OPTICAL SCAN BALLOTS 1 (Aug.
8, 2011) (presented at 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on
Trustworthy Elections), available at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/writein-
evt11.pdf. In contrast, the write-in attempt may be discovered in an audit, a recount, or any
other postelection proceeding examining ballots on which no vote for the office in question was
revealed during initial processing.
136. Though it is not clear that these results are representative, one study found that 16
percent of ballots with legible write-in votes in a single election—hundreds of ballots—did not
fill in a corresponding bubble. Id. at 12. 
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Similarly, in a postelection process to contest disputed election
results, many states provide the opportunity for litigants to present
evidence regarding the validity of individual ballots, including
testimony by—or concerning—the corresponding voters.137 The
materiality principle does not demand that states offer such an
opportunity. But as long as the forum exists, the state should also
welcome evidence by which voters could prove their substantive
eligibility, rendering flaws from the pre-election process immaterial. 
3. The Value of the Materiality Principle 
The procedures above would allow the ballots of eligible voters to
be cast and counted, once—and only once—no lingering doubt
remains concerning the voter’s eligibility or ballot preference. Most
such manifestations of the materiality principle would take place in
a relatively low-stakes context: the vast majority of elections,
including a substantial number for which the outcome is effectively
preordained,138 produce a clear winner on Election Day. In these
“unexceptional” elections, recognizing the dynamic nature of
materiality has a comparatively limited impact on the election as a
whole. Still, the concept manages to fulfill the primary purposes of
a decision rule for election errors better than the available alterna-
tives. 
In these “unexceptional” elections, society’s interest in producing
an agreed-upon representative is not at stake, no matter what rule
is used to process election errors. Instead, the primary value in
holding the election and not simply anointing the presumptive
137. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-48 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-806 (2012); CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 16502 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-11-206, -209 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
525(b) (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-175 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2107
(2012); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.8b,-14,-15 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE §§ 58.5, 59.2,
59.3, 61.11, 62.11, 62.17 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1447(a) (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 120.165, 120.195 (LexisNexis 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1411 (2012); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 168.747-748 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.561 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1103
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-7 (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.12
(LexisNexis 2012); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 221.009-.010 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 29A.68.050 (LexisNexis 2012).
138. Richard Winger reports that 39.5 percent of state legislative races in 2008 were not
contested by one of the two major parties. Richard Winger, Republicans, Democrats Fail to
Run Against Each Other in 39.5% of State Legislative Elections This November, BALLOT
ACCESS NEWS (Oct. 24, 2008), http://bit.ly/VXeiz.
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winner is in ensuring that as many individuals as possible compris-
ing the eligible electorate feel like they have fully participated.139
The static conception of materiality—which preserves the ability of
a vote to be counted despite errors that appear immaterial when
they are committed—mildly realizes this goal, and does so better
than a regime that refuses to acknowledge the immateriality of any
error or that penalizes eligible voters for their own errors even when
the errors do not leave any question about their eligibility. 
The dynamic conception of materiality realizes the value better
still, for the simplest of reasons: it maximizes the potential to tally
ballots cast by individuals who are unquestionably eligible members
of the community, without compromising any safeguards that pre-
vent ineligible voting. That is, the materiality principle increases
the accuracy of the election’s assessment of the eligible electorate’s
preferences by taking more of those voters’ preferences into account.
It also increases the ability of eligible electors to participate fully in
determining their representatives. Errors that leave reasonable
doubt about a voter’s eligibility remain preclusive. Those that do
not, yield, so that more eligible members of the community can fully
participate in the process.
The value of this dynamic conception of materiality increases
dramatically in disputed elections. Though most elections are not
close, many are, and a substantial portion are sufficiently close to
run into “overtime,” when the margin of victory is smaller than the
139. To achieve the participatory goal of the election process, the voter must believe not
only that she will be able to cast a ballot but also that the ballot will be accepted and the
preference recorded. See supra text accompanying note 60. Having a ballot rejected,
particularly for a mistake eventually revealed to be immaterial, distinguishes the rejected
voter from the remainder of the community—it is a statement of exclusion and renunciation
rather than inclusion and embrace. That said, there are apparently limits to the importance
of this value. Before Election Day, it is crucial that a voter believe that her ballot will be
counted as intended, even if it is unlikely to be instrumental in the election outcome. But
when voters actually run into difficulty at the polls, in unexceptional elections in which the
outcome is not in doubt, relatively few individuals casting provisional ballots return after
Election Day to correct problems. The expressive benefits of the franchise are apparently
sufficient for electors to confront the logistical hassles of voting once per cycle, but by the end
of the evening of Election Day, with winners declared and the community of voters no longer
engaged as tangibly in a joint endeavor, few voters overall are motivated to spend additional
energy correcting mistakes. If the ultimate validity of the ballot were a more significant
component of the expressive value of voting, we would expect substantially more interest in
resolving provisional ballot issues in the days following even unexceptional elections.
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perceived margin of error or uncertainty.140 If pre-election or
Election Day errors are shown to be immaterial in a postelection
proceeding, legitimate ballots cast by eligible voters that would
otherwise be discarded may be counted. And because postelection
proceedings are triggered by photo-finish elections, a dynamic
assessment of materiality could well change the result of the closest
races, ensuring greater accuracy in our most closely fought contests.
For example, allowing the materiality of errors to change over
time would have radically changed the analysis, and potentially the
result, of the 2008 Franken-Coleman contest for a Minnesota U.S.
Senate seat.141 In that race, which was ultimately certified with a
margin of 312 votes out of 2.9 million cast,142 thousands of absentee
ballots remained uncounted because of alleged errors on absentee
ballot envelopes.143 These errors primarily involved violations of two
sets of procedural rules designed to ensure that absentee ballots
were lawfully cast by eligible electors. The first set of rules required
that the voter—the same person at the same address listed on the
application for the absentee ballot—sign the ballot envelope in a
designated space, reflecting the voter’s affirmation that she cast the
ballot in question and that she was an eligible elector.144 The second
set of rules required that a registered voter or notary public witness
the casting of the ballot and signing of the ballot envelope, and
provide certain information on the envelope to document his or her
identity and participation in the process.145
The focus of the Franken-Coleman contest quickly settled into a
dispute about whether Minnesota law demanded “substantial
140. The term “overtime” casually refers to postelection proceedings utilized in close
elections. See, e.g., Liz Robbins, In Overtime, Tight Race for Senate Rests with Vote Counters,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at A25. For a discussion of the resort to litigation upon narrow
margins of victory, see Hasen, supra note 4, at 938-39, 946-59.
141. For a comprehensive review of the contest, see generally Edward B. Foley, The Lake
Wobegone Recount: Minnesota’s Disputed 2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 ELECTION L.J. 129
(2011).
142. Franken Appeal, 767 N.W.2d 453, 456 (Minn. 2009). 
143. See id. at 458-62; Franken Trial, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934, ¶¶ 84-85, 129-38
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 2009); Foley, supra note 141, at 132 n.12.
144. See MINN. STAT. §§ 203B.07-.08, .12 (2008) (amended in 2010); MINN. R. 8210.0500-
.0600 (2008) (amended in 2010); Franken Appeal, 767 N.W.2d at 460. 
145. MINN. STAT. § 203B.07(2); MINN. R. 8210.0500-.0600. As noted, these rules have since
been modified, in part due to the problems revealed in the 2008 election. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 203B.07-.08, .12 (2010); MINN. R. 8210.0500-.0600 (2010).
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compliance” or “strict compliance” with the procedural regulations
of the absentee ballot process, including the two sets of rules
above.146 If “substantial compliance” were the touchstone, many of
the disputed absentee ballots might have been lawfully cast and
therefore counted in the contest process.147 If, instead, “strict com-
pliance” were required, the disputed absentee ballots would more
likely have remained excluded from the count.148
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
Minnesota law demanded “strict compliance” with Minnesota
procedures, dependent, in part, on fault.149 Some mistakes by elec-
tion officials could be forgiven,150 but mistakes by voters, even when
immaterial, would render their ballots invalid.151 Most of the
absentee ballots in question revealed mistakes by voters that, when
held to a purported “strict compliance” standard, were rejected.152 
In truth, though the trial court purported to require “strict
compliance” with the relevant statutes for voter errors, even this
rule was not applied consistently. For example, Minnesota law
required rejecting a ballot if the certificate on the ballot envelope
146. See, e.g., Franken Appeal, 767 N.W.2d at 460-62. 
147. See Foley, supra note 141, at 149-50. As Professor Foley notes, there is no reliable
evidentiary record definitively establishing the number of ballots with defects that would have
counted based on “substantial compliance” with the election laws. Id. at 154 &  n.160. In part,
the inability to establish a definitive number is due not only to the lack of evidence marshaled
by litigants concerning the nature of the errors on each ballot (and the denial of public review
of the ballots themselves), id., but also the inherent subjectivity in distinguishing errors that
reflect “substantial compliance” with a mandatory standard and those that do not.  
148. See Franken Appeal, 767 N.W.2d at 462; Foley, supra note 141, at 149-50. But see
Foley, supra note 67, at 5-10 (noting that several thousand of the rejected absentee ballots
may have actually satisfied a strict compliance standard).
149. Franken Appeal, 767 N.W.2d at 461-62; Franken Trial, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL
981934, ¶¶ 131-34 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 2009).
150. Not all mistakes by election officials led to the counting of the associated ballots.
Election officials were required by statute to provide registration forms to any unregistered
voter requesting an absentee ballot, MINN. STAT. § 203B.06(4) (2008); some apparently failed
to do so, and the would-be voters did not become registered. Order for Delivery of Ballots to
Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State for Review by the Court at 10-12, Franken Trial,
No. 62-CV-09-56 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 2009). Despite the official error, the court did not
count ballots by these unregistered voters. Id. Similarly, ballots were rejected when cast by
electors who did not sign their absentee ballot envelopes because officials had covered the
appropriate signature lines with stickers. Order Following Hearing at 13-14, Franken Trial,
No. 62-CV-09-56 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 13, 2009).
151. Franken Appeal, 767 N.W.2d at 461-62. 
152. See id. at 462; Franken Trial, 2009 WL 981934, ¶¶ 83-85, 92-93, 131-38. 
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was not “completed as prescribed in the directions for casting an
absentee ballot.”153 Those directions, in turn, identified a particular
location for the voter’s name, address, and signature, and a partic-
ular location for the name, address, signature, and title of a wit-
ness.154 Yet ballots were accepted if the voter signed in an incorrect
location, despite the state’s directions.155 In contrast, ballots were
rejected if the witness was a notary public who did not include an
official seal, despite the fact that the absentee ballot directions
mentioned no such seal requirement.156
The point of the above discussion is not that the Minnesota courts
erred in choosing “strict” or “substantial” compliance, or that they
erred in applying that standard. Rather, the example reflects the
fact that whatever the outcome of such a choice, the standard
actually applied leaves substantial opportunity for judicial officials
to determine which errors to forgive and which errors to hold
preclusive. Moreover, the standard itself provides no meaningful
guidance as to how this exercise of judicial discretion should be
directed. 
Using the materiality principle, the Minnesota courts might have
found a superior resolution to the controversy without substantial
further cost and without provoking future deviations from proper
procedure.157 On Election Day in Minnesota, many of the errors on
the disputed absentee ballot envelopes might legitimately have been
material, creating doubt about the voter’s identity or eligibility, or
the degree to which the ballot was cast free of coercion. On that day,
the officials charged with evaluating absentee ballots were justified
153. MINN. STAT. § 203B.12(2) (2008).
154. MINN. R. 8210.0500-.0600 (2008).
155. Order for Delivery of Ballots to Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State for Review
by the Court, supra note 150, at 15-16.
156. Order Following Hearing, supra note 150, at 14-15. Minnesota law listed several other
requirements not pertinent to notarization; these requirements, and the requirement to
complete the absentee ballot certificate “as prescribed in the directions,” were expressly
identified as the exclusive reasons to reject a ballot. MINN. STAT. § 203B.12(2) (“There is no
other reason for rejecting an absentee ballot.”). 
157. Minnesota law did not at the time appear to permit the application of the materiality
principle to absentee ballots. However, a federal statute—not raised by either party in the
contest—might not only permit, but require, its application. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, § 101(a), 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B) (2006)); see infra
Part IV.B.
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in declining to count the ballots as long as reasonable doubt about
the elector’s qualifications or legitimate preferences remained. 
When the election returns established that the race was close
enough for a postelection process, however, the opportunity arose for
the materiality principle to do more meaningful work.158 Individual
voters gave testimony in the course of the contest litigation.159 In
many circumstances, it is likely that the testimony reliably estab-
lished that the electors in question were eligible to vote on Election
Day and had actually cast the disputed ballots, free of undue
influence.160 Once the testimony established that the individuals
were, on Election Day, substantively qualified to vote in the
election, the earlier errors on the absentee ballot envelopes calling
that eligibility into question became immaterial. Recognizing the
dynamic nature of materiality would have made it possible to count
the ballots in question.
Indeed, postelection procedures will often make such assessments
possible. Many postelection proceedings provide a suitable forum for
verifying the eligibility of voters whom errors have snagged at an
earlier stage.161 Documentation can be examined, usually under
judicial supervision.162 Candidates and parties, facing victory or loss,
have the incentive to deliver voters for personal testimony. Voters
with the ability to ensure that their ballot—suddenly potentially
decisive—is counted have the incentive to make themselves avail-
able. If flaws leave a voter’s eligibility in doubt on Election Day, the
postelection process provides a reasonably structured opportunity
to resolve that doubt conclusively. 
158. Cf. Edward B. Foley, State Law Issues Loom Large in Coleman v. Franken Appeal,
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (May 5, 2009), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/
index.php?ID=6075 (contrasting the information available, and time constraints operative,
for election-night determinations and for determinations during “a month-long review process
conducted by an absentee ballot board”).
159. Franken Trial, 2009 WL 981934, ¶ 23, att. A n.1.
160. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Factual Points and Uncertainties Relevant to the Coleman
v. Franken Appeal, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (May 14, 2009), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=6149 (“The process that the trial court employed
permitted voters to testify that the two signatures were theirs and that the local officials had
wrongly rejected their ballot[s] on this ground.”). 
161. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Franken Trial, 2009 WL 981934, ¶¶ 24-25.
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Capturing this opportunity best serves the purposes of the elec-
tion process. Even in an unexceptional election, the materiality
principle fosters eligible electors’ sense that they have been able to
participate in their own governance. In “election overtime,” the
participatory value to each voter is starkly multiplied because each
voter is keenly aware that her disputed ballot adds tangibly and
concretely to the prospect of victory for her favored candidate.
Moreover, in “overtime,” the materiality principle fulfills an
interest largely absent from unexceptional elections. In “overtime,”
there is a legitimate dispute concerning the identity of the candidate
who best represents the expressed preferences of the eligible
electorate. The materiality principle—and particularly the dynamic
reassessment of materiality—best resolves this dispute. It maxi-
mizes the accuracy of the election’s result by maximizing the
chances that an eligible elector’s ballot is able to be counted—by
definition, without any associated increase in the likelihood that an
unreliable ballot is tallied. The materiality principle is a compara-
tively low-cost means to ensure that the election results are as
accurate in what they purport to measure as they can be.
4. Potential Concerns
Giving life to the materiality principle, even in an unexceptional
election in which the winning candidate is never in doubt, may
raise several objections. I turn briefly to those concerns in this
Subsection.
a. Opportunistic Behavior
First, some may believe that the materiality principle will create
an opening for opportunistic behavior, by encouraging voters to
violate procedures that are necessary to ensure a reliable election.
In most circumstances, however, rational voters will not intention-
ally violate election procedures relying on the chance that a breach
will eventually be found immaterial. Even when an election’s result
is not in doubt, voters want to know that their votes will count163
163. See supra notes 60, 139 and accompanying text.
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—and that impulse provides a sufficient deterrent to knowing mal-
feasance or lazy fatalism. A voter will tend to follow the state’s rules
to the best of her ability, because it will always be easier to attempt
to comply with the rules in the first instance than to try to later
dispel the doubt that a material error creates. Consider the example
of a registration flaw: sending in one accurate form will always
entail less effort than sending in a flawed form and later taking the
steps necessary to understand and correct the error if it turns out
to be material.164 Nor do postelection proceedings present additional
opportunities for the strategic presentation of falsified “corrections”
to earlier errors. In the white-hot crucible of a recount or contest, all
eyes are focused on the bona fides of each disputed ballot and each
disputed ballot’s elector; opportunities for fraud are, if anything,
starkly diminished.
For most violations of election regulations, forgiving immaterial
errors does not create substantial incentives for opportunistic ex
ante misbehavior. In some cases, however, the nature of the reg-
ulation creates an incentive for strategic actors to deviate from strict
procedural rules in order to gain a meaningful tactical advantage.
In such circumstances, the materiality principle advanced in this
Article is ill-advised as a decision rule for error. 
Deadlines represent one such category. There are several im-
portant deadlines involved in the practical administration of elec-
tions: deadlines to register to vote,165 to apply for an absentee
ballot,166 and to cast a ballot in the election.167 And just as homework
and tax forms are regularly submitted at the last possible moment,
voters too act primarily on the brink of these deadlines, and some-
164. In more formal terms, for voters who wish their votes to count, the net costs of
strategic noncompliance include the cost to determine which breaches of election regulations
are likely to be immaterial, and the costs to correct breaches when the voter’s determination
is incorrect, less the negligible savings of strategic noncompliance for breaches believed likely
to be immaterial. Those costs will almost always exceed the costs of initial good-faith
compliance. 
165. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-416 (2012) (closing registration “during the 21 days
before a primary or general election”).
166. See, e.g., id. § 24.2-701(B)(2) (requiring that an application by mail for an absentee
ballot “be made to the appropriate registrar no later than 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day prior
to the election in which the applicant offers to vote”).
167. See, e.g., id. § 24.2-603 (“The officers of elections shall list the names of all qualified
voters in line before the polling place at 7:00 p.m. and permit those voters and no others to
vote after 7:00 p.m.”).
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times beyond them.168 Without questioning the utility or necessity
of these deadlines, it is not difficult to contemplate that voters
would indeed seek to capitalize on a rule forgiving “immaterial”
lapsed deadlines by intentionally complying with election proce-
dures belatedly. In the case of most election errors, the incremental
effort required to compensate for the error is its own deterrent to
intentional violation of the relevant rule. However, when deadlines
are involved, there is little incremental cost to waiting, and there-
fore little natural deterrent. The preclusive effect of a lapsed dead-
line may therefore be necessary to ensure compliance in the normal
course. An untimely registration form should not be evaluated based
on the materiality principle, because constantly increasing untimeli-
ness will result. A timely form with errors, on the other hand, may
safely be treated by the materiality principle without fear of undue
opportunism.
Errors in marking the ballot itself also present an unusual case,
counseling for application of the materiality principle but not its
dynamic incarnation. When a ballot is marked in erroneous fashion,
it is one thing to evaluate that ballot on its face for questions about
the materiality of the error: that is, to evaluate whether a reason-
able decision maker could substantially question the voter’s in-
tended choice. This is the static version of the materiality principle,
and in Alaska’s 2010 U.S. Senate race, with Lisa Murkowski
running against Joe Miller and Scott McAdams as a write-in can-
didate,169 the materiality principle would have counseled in favor of
counting write-in ballots for “Lisa Murkowsky” but not for “Senator
M.” 
Dynamically reassessing the materiality of errors in selecting a
candidate on the ballot—presumably by taking postelection tes-
timony to ascertain a voter’s intent—presents too large a risk that
the proffered evidence will be unreliable. In every other postelection
application of the dynamic aspect of materiality, the voter’s ballot
preferences are firmly established; the only question concerns the
voter’s eligibility on Election Day, which is not easily retroactively
fabricated. This is not so for ballot markings. The temptation for a
168. See, e.g., Declaration of Glenn T. Burhans, Jr., In Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at Exhibit E, Browning I, No. 4:07-cv-402 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2007) (Doc. 6).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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voter casting a ballot for “Senator M.” to change her mind in a
postelection proceeding, or for a voter to vote strategically for
“Senator M.” in order to preserve postelection options, presents a
substantial risk of opportunism not present in other circumstances.
Though erroneous markings on the ballot itself present fruitful
territory for a static conception of materiality, this is one category
of error for which the materiality determination should be fixed in
time.170
b. Cost
A second concern is that, even if voters do not intentionally
produce forms with flaws, some may expect that the materiality
principle will substantially increase the burden on officials. In most
circumstances, this fear should also remain unrealized. 
As articulated here, the state’s obligation under the materiality
principle would be relatively modest.171 When faced with a voter’s
attempt to fulfill an election requirement, the state need not under-
take any incremental procedure to test for error or seek corrective
information; if error exists, the state need not undertake an expen-
sive investigation into the source of the blame.172 Rather, when
presented initially with an apparent error, the same decision maker
recognizing the error need only determine whether that error is
material. If not, the voter or vote proceeds as if the violation had not
170. Other regulatory categories with a risk of misaligned incentives if immaterial errors
are forgiven include some requirements of candidates, parties, and initiative proponents. See,
e.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 397-400 (4th ed.
2008) (presenting examples concerning deviations in the text of ballot initiatives and late
replacements to party nominees represented on the ballot). 
171. Indeed, in other legal contexts, the state’s duty to mitigate harm in a process that it
controls and which directly governs fundamental rights is far more substantial. See, e.g.,
supra note 81 (describing a prosecutor’s duty, under the Constitution and applicable rules of
professional ethics, to disclose affirmatively all evidence tending to negate guilt or mitigate
the severity of the offense for punishment).
172. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 850 F. Supp. 2d 795, 823-30, 833
(S.D. Ohio 2012) (describing the extended process of reviewing errors to attempt to allocate
fault, including more than four hundred subpoenas, eight hundred questionnaires, and a
three-week hearing, that finally resolved a juvenile court judicial race more than fourteen
months after Election Day); cf. id. at 818-22, 825-28 (describing the various pollworker errors,
only some of which were deemed legally meaningful).
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occurred. If so, the voter enters a parallel state in which her ability
to express a ballot preference is preserved but rendered provisional. 
Dynamic reassessment adds little to the workload. When pre-
sented with an apparent correction, the state need merely accept the
proffered information. It need not, however, give immediate effect
to the correction. When, in the course of the election cycle, the state
is otherwise obligated to assess the legitimacy of a vote of question-
able validity, the state need merely account for the information it
has been given to determine whether an initial flaw remains
material. 
Consider a jurisdiction recognizing the dynamic nature of mate-
riality. This jurisdiction’s officials would review registration forms,
just as they do today. Given an error reasonably calling a voter’s
qualifications into question, they would deny her full registration,
just as today. If she corrected the problem before the registration
deadline, she would be registered, just as today. If she corrected the
error at a later point, she would be asked to vote a provisional
ballot, just as today; that ballot’s validity would later be assessed,
just as today. No incremental steps are necessary beyond the simple
tasks of preserving the evidence of the correction for review at the
appropriate point and creating the legal possibility of acknowledg-
ing the evidence’s relevance. The materiality principle is merely an
interpretive rule to gauge the validity of a disputed ballot, based on
a mild expansion of the available evidentiary pool. It should not
notably increase either the quantity of provisional ballots cast or the
effort required of officials to resolve them.173
173. In contrast, the absentee context may present modest incremental costs. The only
practical means within any given election cycle to give meaning to a change in the materiality
of an error on an absentee ballot application is to allow the absentee voter to cast a ballot that
has the potential to be counted if the error becomes immaterial. This would likely result in
a number of “provisional” absentee ballots sent by election officials and cast by voters, equal
to the number of absentee applications presently rejected because of eligibility concerns. As
of 2011, this number is not reliably recorded nationwide. The Election Assistance
Commission’s Election Administration and Voting Survey—the most comprehensive proxy
available—tracks the disposition of absentee ballots, but not absentee ballot applications. See
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2010 U.S. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION & VOTING SURVEY sec.
C, available at http://bit.ly/oIwkdw.
Accommodating such ballots would require a tracking system to segregate and identify
absentee ballots that are presumptively invalid, corresponding to applications with flaws that
appear material. Most jurisdictions should already have similar tracking mechanisms to
identify absentee ballots cast by, inter alia, new voters who have registered by mail and whose
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Nor would the conception of materiality advanced in this Article
substantially increase the volume or cost of postelection litigation.
Elections in which the count of disputed provisional and absentee
ballots174 exceeds the margin of victory are likely to proceed to
enhanced postelection scrutiny under any standard that permits
counting a disputed provisional or absentee ballot, whether or not
materiality is the touchstone. If, for example, fault is the measure
by which errors are evaluated, a postelection proceeding will have
to assess disputed evidence attributing blame for the errors’
existence. Modifying the object of the inquiry to the errors’ material-
ity should not add substantially to either the quantum or duration
of postelection proceedings. Once a case-by-case review begins,
recognizing the materiality principle merely helps to get the answer
right.
c. Bias
Third, some may anticipate that the materiality principle
increases the potential for bias or perceived bias in the system. One
expression of this bias concerns the affected electorate. Procedural
rules theoretically apply equally to similarly situated electors, but
it may be that officials have at their disposal information to resolve
eligibility questions more readily for a select portion of the elector-
ate. That is, officials might be better equipped to render certain
errors immaterial for only certain electors, or certain electors might
themselves be better equipped to render errors immaterial, skewing
the pool of ballots ultimately recognized as valid.
One rejoinder to this concern looks to further empirical study.
With the cooperation of election officials, it should be possible to test
whether there are currently significant demographic differences
among the populations of eligible electors who attempt to register,
identity has not already been verified under HAVA. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b) (2006); supra
text accompanying notes 109-15. For those that do not, giving effect to the dynamic nature of
materiality entails an incremental burden.
174. If jurisdictions adopt the materiality principle in the absentee context and allow for
the submission of “provisional” absentee ballots, the number of disputed absentee ballots may
increase, which might lead to a modest increase in the number of elections in which disputed
absentee ballots are potentially outcome determinative. The absence of relevant data makes
the size of the potential increase difficult to assess. See supra note 173.
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those who attempt to vote, and those whose ballots are actually
counted. It would be interesting to further test whether the
application of either the materiality principle or the dynamic
reappraisal of materiality exacerbated or mitigated any existing
level of skew. 
A second rejoinder to the bias concern is conceptual. As long as
every voter has the legitimate opportunity to render an error
immaterial, their differential ability to take advantage of this pro-
cess becomes no different than any other resource more readily
available to some voters by virtue of their socioeconomic class, or to
some officials by virtue of the socioeconomic class they serve. Such
differences are regrettable and worthy of both public and private
resources working toward equalizing access. But they are not
reasons to deny the eligible electors who happen to be better off
their legitimate opportunity to cast a valid ballot.
A different expression of bias in the system concerns the prefer-
ences of the decision makers themselves. Gauging the materiality
of an error amounts to a judgment call and thereby admits flexibil-
ity into the decision process. Studies have shown that in the election
arena, when there is room for flexibility, bias—particularly partisan
bias—has the potential to infect even the judgment of decision
makers who perceive themselves to be acting neutrally.175 
This is indeed a serious consideration. The issue is mitigated by
the burden of proof of the materiality inquiry, which renders the
inquiry less flexible than it may at first appear. Given a violation of
prescribed regulations, the question is not whether a voter is or is
not eligible, but whether a reasonable decision maker could sub-
stantially question whether the voter is or is not eligible; not
whether a voter intended to choose candidate X or Y, but whether
a reasonable decision maker could substantially question whether
the voter intended to choose X or Y. The materiality principle only
provides that an error should be discounted when that error no
longer leaves any reasonable decision maker with a substantial
question about a voter’s eligibility or candidate choice. The relevant
decision is one step removed from the ultimate answer sought, and
175. See, e.g., Kyle C. Kopko, Sarah McKinnon Bryner, Jeffrey Budziak, Christopher J.
Devine & Steven P. Nawara, In the Eye of the Beholder? Motivated Reasoning in Disputed
Elections, 33 POL. BEHAV. 271, 272-73 (2011).
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at a fairly high threshold of certainty. That distance may provide a
sufficient cushion to overcome decision-making bias.
An additional response to this concern is that the relevant choice
is not between the flexibility of a materiality standard or the
inflexible—and thereby bias-resistant—application of every precise
rule on the books. In practice, as described above, no jurisdiction
truly adopts a zero-tolerance rule for all violations of all electoral
regulations.176 Instead, administrative and judicial decision makers
currently decide that certain rules are merely precatory, or that
transgressions of other rules are to be forgiven if the transgressions
are “minor” or “insubstantial” or not the “fault” of the voter.177 Each
of these standards is a form of flexibility, susceptible to the bias of
the decision maker. Even beyond the choice of which rules to
forgive, a decision that purports to apply rules strictly may bend in
some applications but not others.178 Indeed, to the extent that the
materiality principle is grounded in concrete references to a voter’s
eligibility or clear choice of candidate, the grounding provides less
opportunity for the infection of bias than the available alternatives. 
d. Due Process
Fourth, and specific to the reevaluation of materiality in a
postelection process, some might question whether allowing the
materiality of an error to change after Election Day involves
changing the rules in a manner that threatens due process.179
Procedures regulating the conduct of an election are set before the
election is held, and the conception of materiality suggested in this
Article would allow some citizens’ votes to be counted despite a
failure to abide by these regulations. Particularly when an election
is sent into “overtime” because of a few disputed votes, there is a
strong interest in ensuring that the process to resolve the election
comports with the stable rule of law. This interest in abiding by
preestablished rules may be seen to conflict with the societal
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
179. See Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995); see generally Richard H. Pildes,
Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (2001).
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interest in discerning, as accurately as possible, the true preference
of the eligible electorate. 
The dynamic conception of materiality, when acknowledged as a
principle built into the regulatory structure from the outset, may
help to resolve—or avoid—this “tragic choice.”180 It serves as an
interpretive meta-rule, recasting procedural protections for deter-
mining the eligibility of the individual voter not as fixed “thumbs
up” or “thumbs down” moments, but rather as checkpoints along the
road. At time t, a citizen whose eligibility is reasonably in question
will have been flagged as presumptively ineligible; if, at time t + 1,
the question has been resolved, the flag can be removed. This is no
deviation from the rule of law; under the dynamic conception of
materiality, the governing rules contemplate a conditional adjust-
ment of status.181 Such a meta-rule can and should be declared well
before Election Day and should be implemented uniformly through-
out the election cycle. A postelection rule change deviating from ex
ante expectations is neither necessary nor warranted.
e. Bush v. Gore
The prospect of the exercise of individual judgment with respect
to the counting of votes after an election also inevitably draws
comparisons to Bush v. Gore.182 It is sufficient for present discussion
to recall that the case found a constitutional equal protection
violation in counties’ quasi-adjudicatory decisions that different
standards would apply to similar ballots, both within and across
180. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (identifying
circumstances forcing choices between deeply held conflicting values). 
181. Similarly, a conception of material error that permits eligible voters to vote despite
minor errors in procedural prerequisites should not be considered a “dilution” of the votes of
those who managed to navigate procedural waters without flaw, even if the particular
application of materiality is determined after the election. See, e.g., Roe, 43 F.3d at 581. The
voters who fall victim to errors later proved to be immaterial are by definition eligible
electors. Allowing those votes to count does not dilute the votes of other eligible electors by
expanding the electorate beyond any ex ante expectation held by any member of the
electorate. Cf. Curley v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration, No. 45D01-0810-PL-
00082, at 21 (Ind. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2008) (emphasizing, in the context of a dispute over early
voting locations, that “[t]he casting of ballots by other lawfully registered voters within the
relevant jurisdiction is democracy, not vote dilution”), aff’d, 896 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008).
182. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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jurisdictions.183 Indeed, the Court apparently believed that even
absent differences in the declared rules applied by different decision
makers, a general “intent of the voter” standard would be constitu-
tionally insufficient in a postelection proceeding without more
narrowly defined, administrable standards.184 Though virtually no
procedural rule is sufficiently free of ambiguity to preclude entirely
the possibility of local variation, there is little question that
requiring officials to exercise judgment in determining the changing
materiality of an election error expands the risk of inconsistency
that so concerned the Court.185
Still, as explained above, the materiality standard is one step
removed from the generalized discretion that the Court confronted
in Bush v. Gore.186 The materiality standard does not ask decision
makers to determine whether a voter is eligible, but rather to
determine whether there is any significant doubt about whether the
voter is eligible; it does not ask them to discern the intent of the
voter, but rather to determine whether there is any significant
doubt about the intent of the voter. The distinction is meaningful
and likely to reduce disagreement and local inconsistency in the
application of the principle. It does not eliminate the possibility that
some local officials will accept evidence of eligibility that others
discount. However, the evidentiary burden embedded in the
inquiry—that an error becomes immaterial only upon eliminating
any reasonable doubt caused by the flaw—does limit the opportu-
nity for wild variance.187 
183. Id. at 106-07.
184. Id. at 106; cf. Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2514-15 (2003) (suggesting, by analogy
to the jurisprudence of speech permit cases, a potential violation of equal protection principles
in the delegation of overbroad discretion, even without proof of disparate practice).
185. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 570 (2006)
(noting the conflict between “binding officials to clear rules known in advance” and “allowing
officials to exercise informed discretion in individual cases”); Tokaji, supra note 184, at 2420-
21 (reviewing the tension between preserving discretion and preserving equality). 
186. See supra paragraph following note 175.
187. If further indicia of consistent applicability are required, there are ways to raise the
standard further still; for example, the materiality principle might only be applied in
postelection contests by groups of multiple decision makers, and only when they unanimously
conclude that an error is immaterial. Cf., e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-5.2(B)(4) (West 2012)
(“For paper ballots that are hand-tallied, a vote shall be counted if ... the presiding judge and
election judges for the precinct unanimously agree that the voter’s intent is clearly
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Moreover, most postelection proceedings will be conducted under
the supervision of a central judicial or administrative actor.188 In the
aftermath of the Bush v. Gore controversy, such figures will likely
be highly attuned to the potential for intra- or interjurisdiction
variance and may be able to regulate local decision making in the
event that it appears likely to produce divergent results.
f. Perceived Politicization
Bush v. Gore also invokes a related concern: the risk that post-
election reassessments of eligibility, even if consistent and princi-
pled, will further the appearance that the election administration
process, and judicial actors who may be overseeing postelection
proceedings, are politicized.189 If an election is sufficiently close to
have entered into a postelection process, individual evaluations of
eligibility or ballot preference could well determine the winner. And
assessments of materiality with respect to voter intent are related
directly to votes counted or uncounted for particular candidates. It
is difficult to be comfortable with nuanced postelection assessments
of voter eligibility or intent, even if they are executed with absolute
neutrality, when the party on the losing end will likely view them
as fraught with political favoritism.
These latter two objections—both dependent on the mild expan-
sion of postelection exercises of judgment in the interest of arriving
at a more inclusive, accurate result—are substantial and worth
serious consideration. The prevailing thrust in contemporary schol-
arship, certainly, is to avoid any increase in the flexibility of the
postelection process.190 Yet the only way to evaluate the overall
discernable.”).
188. See Miller v. Treadwell, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (D. Alaska 2010) (distinguishing
Bush v. Gore based on the use of a single decision maker for a postelection proceeding
permitting the use of discretion); Douglas, supra note 7.
189. See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 170, at 398 (presenting the “serious danger”
that when procedural rules are to be waived in cases of “substantial compliance,” judges’
rulings “will be affected by their political preferences”).
190. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE
IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 60 (2001), available at http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb246/99
_full_report.pdf; Edward B. Foley, The Promise and Problems of Provisional Voting, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1203-04 (2005); Kopko et al. supra note 175; Nathaniel Persily,
“Celebrating” the Tenth Anniversary of the 2000 Election Controversy: What the World Can
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impact of the potential inconsistency and politicization caused by
allowing the materiality of pre-election errors to vary even after
Election Day is in relation to the other options available for
assessing disputed ballots. 
I take as a given that a postelection process takes place only if a
pre-election process to resolve immaterial errors has failed. The
choice of decision rule is then distilled to five basic options. One,
hold a new election.191 Two, count no votes that are in any way
connected to a violation of established procedure, and thereby risk
not only granting victory to a candidate who did not earn a plurality
of the votes of the eligible electorate attempting to express a
preference,192 but also creating public dissatisfaction in the proce-
dural fairness of an election decided purely by technical error.
Three, count some votes related to a violation of established pro-
cedure, based perhaps on fault or magnitude of the error, even when
some of the rejected votes are known to be cast by eligible members
of the community—with the same risk of an inaccurate result and
a process perceived as unjust.193 Four, count the votes of eligible
Learn From the Recent History of Election Dysfunction in the United States, 44 IND. L. REV.
85, 87 (2010); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,
Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1246-49
(2005).
191. See Huefner, supra note 8, at 283-84, 317-19 (discussing concerns with new elections);
Steven J. Mulroy, Right Without a Remedy? The “Butterfly Ballot” Case and Court-Ordered
Federal Election “Revotes,” 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 215, 240-43 (2001) (analyzing both partial
and complete “revotes”).
192. I use “plurality” here as a convenient shorthand, because it is the measure that
determines the winners of public office in most American jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 15452 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-173 (West 2012); TEX. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 2.001 (West 2011). The materiality principle, however, is consistent with any voting
rule, including alternatives to the plurality-win system. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY
OF THE MAJORITY (1994) (describing alternatives to plurality voting); Richard Briffault, Lani
Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy: The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental
Fairness in Representative Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 418, 432-41 (1995) (book review)
(same); Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 251-56 (same).
193. It is useful to recall the astute assessment of the Florida Supreme Court: 
We first take note that the real parties in interest here, not in the legal sense
but in realistic terms, are the voters. They are possessed of the ultimate interest
and it is they whom we must give primary consideration.... By refusing to
recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right to a citizen to vote for the sake
of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we would in effect nullify
that right....
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citizens when errors are, or have become, immaterial, in an effort to
come as close as possible to an accurate understanding of the
electorate’s preferences without diluting the electorate pool. Or five,
acknowledge the futility of any attempt to accurately determine the
plurality choice when an election is sufficiently close, and decide the
victor by lot.194 
In some ways, this last option presents the most serious challenge
to the materiality principle. I acknowledge the substantial appeal
in delivering to a random procedure those scenarios in which the
margin of irreducible error exceeds the margin of victory. But I also
suggest that once we have entrusted a selection process to a popular
election, there exists a moral imperative to attempt to reduce appar-
ent error whenever possible, at least until the winner is decisively
established. Even when our “capacity for accurate tabulation”
makes it epistemologically impossible for us to determine the elec-
torate’s expressed preference,195 we are obligated to make the
attempt to the best of our ability, in order to fulfill the purpose of
the election to the best of our ability. The argument applies with
even greater strength to any nonrandom resolution: among com-
paratively equal-cost alternatives, the preferred option should be
the one that yields the most accurate result. Postelection process is
expensive and time consuming, and the exercise of any discretion
risks the appearance of politicizing the process if decision makers do
not conduct themselves in a manner beyond reproach. Fault- or
magnitude-based decision rules are not free from this risk. Even if
suboptimal, the materiality principle may be the least bad of the
available alternatives.196
[A] majority of the voters in the Second District preferred Mr. Boardman over
Mr. Esteva in October, 1973. This must not be overlooked. If we are to
countenance a different result, one contrary to the apparent will of the people,
then we must do so on the basis that the sanctity of the ballot and the integrity
of the election were not maintained, and not merely on the theory that the
absentee ballots cast were in technical violation of the law.
Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975).
194. See generally, e.g., Pitts, supra note 8. 
195. Id. at 746 (quoting Charles Fried, Letter to the Editor, ‘A Badly Flawed Election’: An
Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 22, 2001), www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/feb/22/a-
badly-flawed-election-an-exchange/); see also Huefner, supra note 8, at 323.
196. In this respect, I may place different weights on the varying values of the election
process than other scholars. I agree with the prevailing assessment of the benefit of resolving
immaterial errors before the election whenever possible, and the benefit of providing a forum
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IV. SOURCES OF LAW FOR THE MATERIALITY PRINCIPLE
A. The Federal Constitution
As described in this Article, the materiality principle has a
curious—and uncertain—constitutional status. Relatively few plain-
tiffs challenging state election regulations have framed their claims
by contending that the Federal Constitution prohibits precluding
the vote of an eligible elector due to immaterial errors.197 Even fewer
courts have issued decisions on those grounds.198 And though courts
that have construed state regulations to forgive immaterial errors
may have been motivated by canons of constitutional avoidance,199
they generally have not isolated a federal constitutional materiality
principle as the reason for their action.
Even if not articulated as such, the materiality principle is in
some ways consistent with the Court’s current understanding of
constitutional protections against undue infringement of the right
to help voters turn material errors into immaterial ones. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 190, at
1204-05 & n.69. However, in those circumstances when an election proceeds with errors
unresolved and the result is left in doubt, several scholars seem to place greater weight on the
swift declaration of a winner. See id. at 1203-05; Huefner, supra note 8, at 292-93; John
Copeland Nagle, How Not to Count Votes, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1732, 1762 (2004). In contrast,
I would place greater weight on ensuring that the official elected represents the knowable
expressed preference of the eligible electorate, even if that determination lingers.
It may also be that the difference in weighting is largely illusory, distorted by the outsized
presence of the 2000 election. The above scholars’ preference for a date-certain winner may
be driven by the imperatives of a presidential contest. A contested election for President
involves unique difficulties, driven by the strong need for the polity to have a recognized chief
executive on Inauguration Day. See Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The
Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1267-69, 1271-73 (2006).
In contested elections for state executives, there is comparatively less at stake in ensuring
that the election’s winner is recognized by the start of a term; the consequences of an election
lingering beyond the first day of the session are still less dire when the race concerns one
individual within a multimember legislative delegation. It is not clear whether other scholars’
apparent preference for speed over accuracy, when—and only when—the two are
irreconcilable, extends beyond the presidential context.
197. For a rare example, see Complaint ¶¶ 131-39, Wash. Ass’n of Churches v. Reed, 492
F. Supp. 2d 1264 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (No. 2:06-cv-726).
198. Cf., e.g., Browning II, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (refusing to find a
constitutional burden when error precluded individuals from casting a valid ballot, but also
refraining from discussing circumstances in which that error had been rendered immaterial).
199. See Hasen, Democracy Canon, supra note 9, at 96-100.
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to vote. The Court has established a balancing test to identify
unconstitutional impositions on the right to vote: courts “must
weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury” to the
right to vote “against the precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into
consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary
to burden [an elector’s] rights.”200 Further, the Court has clarified,
“however slight that burden may appear ..., it must be justified by
relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to
justify the limitation.’”201
In this balancing formula, the materiality principle relates
primarily to the state’s interest. Once an error is revealed to be
immaterial, no longer creating any reasonable doubt about the
elector’s qualifications or ballot preference, there are few state
interests that justify allowing that error to have a continuing
preclusive effect.202 If the constitutional balancing test is designed
to ensure that eligible voters are not unnecessarily prevented from
casting a valid ballot, the materiality principle seems particularly
consonant with that value.
That said, most applications of the materiality principle are
probably farther afield from the Court’s current understanding of
constitutional restraints on states. For example, the Court has
rarely, if ever, endorsed such a granular approach to the state’s
interests in election regulation. The analysis above depends on a
particularly narrow tailoring of the state’s regulatory scheme:
rather than allowing the state to justify its regulations in abstract
terms (e.g., procedure X is necessary to ensure that voters are
eligible), the materiality principle would focus on the state’s jus-
tification under particular conditions (e.g., procedure X is necessary
to ensure that voters are eligible even when there exists other,
irrefutable proof of eligibility). The Court seems to countenance such
intrusive federal constitutional supervision only when the regula-
200. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)); see also id. at 210-11 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74 (addressing arguments concerning the
state’s interests in deterrence); see also supra Part III.C.4.b (addressing arguments concerning
the state’s interests in avoiding incremental administrative cost).
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tion in question exacts a particularly severe burden.203 And although
the appropriate constitutional measurement of burden remains in
flux,204 it is difficult to imagine, absent an egregious fact pattern,
the Court of Bush v. Gore finding a sufficient burden to validate a
constitutional claim premised on the state’s obligation to compen-
sate for avoidable mistake. If the materiality principle has a con-
stitutional home at all, it at best represents a seldom-expressed and
severely underenforced constitutional norm.205
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Fortunately, the legal imprimatur of the materiality principle
does not depend on deciding whether it has or has not been—or
should or should not be—constitutionalized, in whole or in part, in
outcome-determinative contexts or in the normal course. Congress
has taken matters into its own hands. 
Section 101(a) of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains
a provision directly referencing election-related errors: 
No person acting under color of law shall ... deny the right of any
individual to vote in any election because of an error or omission
on any record or paper relating to any application, registration,
or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not
material in determining whether such individual is qualified
under State law to vote in such election.206 
It is somewhat surprising how little attention this provision—the
“materiality provision” of the Civil Rights Act—has received. I am
aware of no sustained scholarly examinations of the provision, and
it is seldom addressed in published judicial decisions.207 
203. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 336-37 (2007).
204. See Justin Levitt, Long Lines at the Courthouse: Pre-Election Litigation of Election Day
Burdens, 9 ELECTION L.J. 19, 32-33 (2010) (noting that courts offer varying assessments of
burden based on harm to an individual, a subgroup, or the electorate as a whole, and relying
inconsistently on both absolute magnitude and proportion). 
205. Cf. Hasen, Democracy Canon, supra note 9, at 96-100.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B) (2006) (as amended).
207. In part, this may be because when the materiality provision has been invoked, it is
often in the context of emergency litigation shortly before an election. Such litigation is
frequently resolved in practice by settlement or consent decree. See, e.g., Agreed Entry and
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The materiality provision appears to adopt much of the vision of
materiality proposed in this Article. The provision generally pro-
hibits disenfranchisement based on certain immaterial errors,
determined by whether the errors cast the substantive eligibility of
the elector in doubt.208
Congress had ample reason in 1964 to be concerned by such
disenfranchisement. The substantial legislative record for the
materiality provision focused on techniques by which many local
registrars discriminated against racial minorities.209 Extensive
Order in Resolution of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Brown v. Rokita, No. 1:08-cv-
01484 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2008); Second Amended Order at Exhibits A-E, NAACP v. Harris, No.
1:01-cv-00120 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2002); Complaint ¶ 133, NAACP v. Harris, No. 1:01-cv-
00120 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2002). Such litigation may also be resolved by cursory
determinations on hasty motions for temporary or preliminary relief. E.g., Order, Citizens
Alliance for Secure Elections v. Vu, No. 1:04-cv-2147 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2004); Order, Van
Hollen v. Gov’t Accountability Bd., No. 08-cv-4085 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2008). Such
resolutions are rarely analyzed by commentators or other tribunals.
208. Initially, the provision’s focus on whether the elector is “qualified under State law”
may seem ambiguous: out of context, it is not clear whether this refers to substantive
qualifications (for example, the voter’s personal characteristics, such as identity, age,
citizenship, residence, and lack of a disenfranchising conviction), or procedural qualifications
(the actions—like registration—that a state requires of each citizen in order to vote). 
The latter path, however, swiftly renders the provision meaningless. By definition, errors
that do not impact a procedural qualification carry no risk of disenfranchisement. That is,
every error for which state law would deny an individual’s vote is necessarily an error in a
state’s procedural qualification. It follows that every error for which state law would deny an
individual’s vote is material to determining whether she is procedurally qualified to vote
under state law. 
If the materiality provision addressed only procedural qualifications, the analysis above
shows that it would have absolutely no effect. Because every error that causes
disenfranchisement is necessarily material to determining whether the voter is procedurally
qualified, the provision would allow the state to disenfranchise for every error that causes
disenfranchisement. Conversely, it would prohibit disenfranchisement only for errors that by
definition do not disenfranchise. Even in the vigorous battle regarding the utility of canons
of construction, the rule against surplusage, which requires that statutes be interpreted to
avoid rendering a provision meaningless if at all possible, is one of the most widely accepted.
See, e.g., Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000) (referencing “the longstanding canon of
statutory construction that terms in a statute should not be construed so as to render any
provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous”).
Instead, if the materiality provision is to have any meaning, the inquiry must involve not
procedural but rather substantive qualifications of state law: identity, age, citizenship,
residency, and lack of disenfranchising felony conviction or mental incapacitation.
209. See Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2720
(1963) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Att’y Gen.); H.R.
REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 19 (1963); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 5 (1963); 110 CONG. REC.
12,837 (1964) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams); id. at 9113 (statement of Sen.
Kenneth B. Keating); id. at 6741 (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart); id. at 6715-16 (statement
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testimony showed that registrars rejected black applicants on the
basis of purported “errors” on application forms that were hyper-
technical, or entirely invented, while they ignored more substantial
glitches entirely when the applicants were white.210 Among the more
infamous examples was a registration application rejected because
the would-be registrant, required to account for her age in years,
months, and days, missed the mark by one day because the day had
not yet ended.211 Another application was rejected because the
applicant’s state was misspelled as “Louiseana.”212 Still other ap-
plications were rejected because the applicant identified her skin
color as “Negro” instead of “brown,” or “brown” instead of “Negro,”213
or based on the fact that an applicant “underlined ‘Mr.’ when [he]
should have circled it.”214 
Though the primary motivation for the sponsors of the materiality
provision was clearly the confrontation of racial discrimination,
Congress drafted the provision to embrace errors or omissions
beyond those used to discriminate based on race. Some courts have
either presumed this to be an oversight or found that Congress
intended an exclusive racial focus given the overwhelming devotion
of the Act as a whole to race; these courts have held the provision
inapplicable to disenfranchisement absent allegations of racial
discrimination.215 It is more likely, however, that the materiality
provision’s nonracial scope reflects a conscious decision befitting the
of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating); id. at 6650 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits); id. at 6530
(statement of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey); id. at 1693-94 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler);
id. at 1628 (statement of Rep. Seymour Halpern); id. at 1593 (statement of Rep. Leonard
Farbstein); 109 CONG. REC. 5954 (1963) (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart).
210. See supra note 209.
211. Hearings on S. 1731 and 1750 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 101
(1963) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Att’y Gen.); see
also 110 CONG. REC. 6715-16 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating) (recounting
similar rejections).
212. Senate Hearings, supra note 211, at 101.
213. 110 CONG. REC. 6733 (1964) (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart); id. at 6530 (statement
of Sen. Hubert Humphrey).
214. Id. at 1693-94 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
215. See, e.g., Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 839 (S.D. Ind. 2006);
Malinou v. Bd. of Elections, 271 A.2d 798, 803 (R.I. 1970); cf. House Hearings, supra note 209,
at 2720 (explaining that errors are immaterial if forgiven for white citizens but made
determinative for black citizens). But see Ball v. Brown, 450 F. Supp. 4, 7 (N.D. Ohio 1977)
(reviewing cases construing various portions of § 1971 to be applicable beyond racial
discrimination). 
2012] RESOLVING ELECTION ERROR 149
general principle. The text of most other sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ties the relevant right in question to racial discrimina-
tion.216 The text of the materiality provision does not,217 which is a
distinction noted in the contemporaneous legislative debates.218
The scope of the materiality provision is not coextensive with the
materiality principle that I propose in this Article: the provision of
the Civil Rights Act is limited, for example, to errors or omissions
on records or papers involved in the voting process.219 And in tying
materiality determinations to a voter’s eligibility, the provision is at
216. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(a), 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (prohibiting discrimination
in public accommodations “on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin”); id.
§ 301(a) (concerning discrimination in use of public facilities “on account of [ ] race, color,
religion, or national origin”); id. § 402 (concerning lack of equal educational opportunities “by
reason of race, color, religion, or national origin”); id. § 601 (prohibiting discrimination in
programs receiving federal aid “on the ground of race, color, or national origin”); id. § 703(a)
(prohibiting employment practices discriminating “because of [an] individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin”).
217. See Browning I, 522 F.3d 1153, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The text of the resulting
statute, and not the historically motivating examples of intentional and overt racial
discrimination, is thus the appropriate starting point of inquiry in discerning congressional
intent.”).
218. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 77 (1963) (minority report); 110 CONG. REC. 6723-24
(1964) (statements of Sen. Samuel J. Ervin & Sen. Kenneth B. Keating); id. at 6642
(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond); id. at 5878-79 (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd); id. at
1532-33 (statement of Rep. Edwin E. Willis); 109 CONG. REC. 5116-17 (1963) (statement of
Sen. Kenneth B. Keating). 
Moreover, throughout the passionate debate about the constitutionality of the materiality
provision, authority for the provision was expressly tied not only to the antidiscrimination
mandate of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but also to Congress’s race-neutral
power to regulate federal elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. See 110
CONG. REC. 6723-24 (1964) (statements of Sen. Samuel J. Ervin & Sen. Kenneth B. Keating);
id. at 1522 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler). This provides some, albeit admittedly limited,
indication that at least the sponsors intended the provision to be applied even absent racial
bias.
The invocation of Article I, Section 4 raises an intriguing question about whether applying
the materiality provision in race-neutral fashion to votes cast for presidential electors exceeds
the power granted to Congress by Article I. Several commentators have raised the issue of the
distinction between the authority afforded Congress over congressional elections and the
authority afforded Congress over presidential elections. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, “Too Plain
for Argument?” The Uncertain Congressional Power to Require Parties to Choose Presidential
Nominees Through Direct and Equal Primaries, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2009, 2016-18 (2008); see
generally Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power over Presidential
Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851
(2002). Thus far, courts have consistently glossed over any difference. See Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-48 (1934). A more robust explication of the issue is well beyond the
scope of this Article.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B) (2006).
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best awkwardly applied to the original Bush v. Gore problem: errors
or omissions on the face of the ballot itself.220
That said, the provision’s coverage is surprisingly broad, even
beyond its race-blind application.221 First, though the materiality
220. These errors are on papers—ballots—that are certainly requisite to voting under the
statute, and the errors seem to have no bearing on determining whether the individual in
question is qualified to vote under state law. Facially, the materiality provision of the Civil
Rights Act would seem to apply. See supra text accompanying note 206.
However, the provision’s express reference to the voter’s qualifications implies that its
intent is to limit disputes about eligibility to those circumstances in which a voter’s
qualifications are truly in question. The ballot itself has nothing to do with individual
qualifications; American ballots are largely secret ballots, with no link between the face of the
ballot and any given individual. See generally Allison R. Hayward, Bentham and Ballots:
Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39, 48-50 (2010). 
Just as the provision cannot refer to “procedural” qualifications because such a construction
would preclude its application to any error, see supra note 208, the provision also cannot refer
to errors on the ballot’s face because such a construction would require its application to every
plausible error. Other than writing on the ballot face “I am John Smith and I am not eligible
to vote,” no error on a secret ballot can be material to determining the qualifications of the
individual who cast it. That is, if the materiality provision applied to errors on the ballot’s
face, no such error could ever prevent the ballot from counting. The provision seems at best
an awkward fit in such circumstances.
221. In addition to the breadth reviewed below, the materiality provision was amended, one
year after its passage, to apply to state and local elections as well as their federal
counterparts. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 15, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). This
expansion presents some curious issues similar to those raised in note 218, supra, and similar
to the issues of congressional power now generating some controversy with respect to the
Voting Rights Act as a whole. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(addressing a constitutional challenge to section 5 of the Act); Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law
Statutes, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 399-404 (2012) (discussing constitutional controversy with
respect to section 2). The materiality provision’s expansion cannot be justified based on
Congress’s Article I power to regulate elections for U.S. Senators and Representatives.
Instead, sponsors cited congressional power to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of due process and prohibition of arbitrary treatment, as well as its power to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 15,652 (1965) (statement of Rep.
Emanuel Celler). 
A full examination of the impact of the Court’s “New Federalism” on the materiality
provision, much less the full Voting Rights Act, is well beyond the scope of this Article, but
a few notes tracing the contours of the difficulty are in order. It remains unclear, for example,
whether the Fifteenth Amendment provides a more generous basis for congressional action
than the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey,
573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 235-46 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding greater congressional enforcement
authority under the Fifteenth Amendment, given its more limited substantive scope), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193
(2009), with Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 449-62 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that
enforcement powers concerning racial discrimination in voting under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments are essentially coextensive), aff’d 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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provision was motivated by disenfranchisement tied to ostensible
errors by a prospective registrant, the text of the provision is not
limited to errors or omissions by would-be voters.222 Indeed, such a
limitation was removed from the bill. As passed by the House of
Representatives, the provision prohibited officials from “deny[ing]
the right of any individual to vote ... because of an error or omission
of such individual on any record or paper relating to any ... act
requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material.”223 As
amended and signed into law, however, the “limiting language”
tying the error to the would-be voter was deleted.224 The enacted
text states that immaterial errors or omissions on any record or
paper requisite to voting—whether perpetrated by the voter, an
election official, or a third party—cannot be used to deny qualified
individuals the right to vote.225
Second, the text of the provision is also not limited to registration
errors or omissions. Any immaterial error on a record or paper
involved in an “act requisite to voting” falls within its facial scope.226
For purposes of the materiality provision, “voting” includes “all
Enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, at least, has been sharply restricted
since the Voting Rights Act was passed; the precise extent of those limits is still the subject
of much debate. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Pamela S. Karlan,
Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS.
L. REV. 1 (2007); Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights:
Federalism After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799 (2006). It is an open question
whether the Court would accept the proposition that Congress was acting properly under its
Fourteenth Amendment power in this context; that is, in banning the use of immaterial errors
to deny qualified citizens the right to vote, no matter the race of the voter, it is not clear that
the Court would find Congress acting in a manner directly congruent and proportional to
demonstrated constitutional violations. Then, as now, there were plentiful examples of states
and localities barring an effective vote in state and local elections on the basis of trivial errors
that did not call a voter’s fundamental eligibility into question, and perhaps the volume of this
evidence would suffice to establish undue constitutional burden. See, e.g., 1961 U.S. COMM’N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING 54-86 (1961). However, given the continuing confusion over the
contours of the Court’s jurisprudence of constitutional voting rights, it is not certain that the
Court would believe that blocking the vote on the basis of such errors amounted to an
unconstitutionally undue burden on the right to vote. See supra text accompanying notes 200-
05.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B) (2006).
223. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. § 101(a) (as passed by House of Representatives, Feb. 10, 1964)
(emphasis added).
224. 110 CONG. REC. 12,817 (1964) (explaining changes made by substitute Amendment No.
656).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B).
226. Id.
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action necessary to make a vote effective including, but not limited
to, registration or other action required by State law prerequisite to
voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted and included
in the appropriate totals of votes cast.”227 This is a federal law with
substantial, though not unlimited, reach.228
Thus far, however, each of the few courts or commentators ex-
amining the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act has
artificially limited its application—by failing to recognize that the
materiality of a particular error can vary over time. This oversight
has fostered an understanding of materiality that is poorly suited
to both the statute and the election process as a whole. 
Consider as an example Florida State Conference of NAACP v.
Browning, which offers the most extensive interpretation of the
materiality provision to date.229 The case concerned a state variant
of the provision of the Help America Vote Act requiring a voter to
provide her driver’s license or Social Security number on a voter
registration form, and asking officials to attempt to match that
number and other information to motor vehicle or Social Security
227. Id. § 1971(a)(3)(A), (e).
228. By referring to flaws “on any record or paper” that may interfere with the vote,
Congress declined to create a specific statutory remedy for the array of nondocumentary
glitches that impact every election. Still, there are plenty of requisite election records or
papers with the potential for flaws, some of which raise intriguing questions under the
statute. 
Consider, for example, the absentee process. In one respect, no part of the absentee process
is “requisite” to voting, because states need not offer absentee balloting at all. As long as a
jurisdiction conducting elections permits in-person voting on Election Day, it has fulfilled its
constitutional obligation. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-08
(1969). Yet from a closer view of the voting process, once the state invites voters to utilize an
absentee ballot procedure, it may render the individual stages of that procedure “requisite”
to voting. See, e.g., United States v. Boards, 10 F.3d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding an
absentee ballot application to be a “prerequisite to voting” because an absentee voter must first
apply for such a ballot (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(1) (1988))). That is, because of the
compressed nature of the election cycle, the voting process is path dependent: by the time that
an error in the absentee process is discovered, that process may, either legally or practically,
represent the only voting option available to the citizen in question. Some jurisdictions, for
example, preclude any attempt to vote on Election Day once an absentee ballot is mailed, even
if the absentee ballot is rendered invalid due to an error. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-6-16(A)
(LexisNexis 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-301(2) (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-9(b)
(West 2012). For such voters, the absentee ballot becomes a paper relating to an act requisite
to voting at least at the moment it is cast. 
229. 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008). Full disclosure: the author of this Article was co-
counsel for the plaintiffs in the case.
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records.230 Under HAVA, mismatches can be cured all the way
through Election Day and potentially beyond, by showing a range of
permissible documentary identification at any time after the
original error—that is, any time after the original mismatch—no
matter whose fault the mismatch may be.231 Florida instead adopted
a fault-based approach: at the time of the lawsuit, mismatches
caused by state error could be repaired only by showing the original
driver’s license or Social Security card; mismatches caused by
applicant error could not be repaired after the registration deadline
at all.232 That is, a voter mismatched because she transposed two
digits of her driver’s license number on the registration form would
be unable to cast a valid ballot—despite verifying her identity by
showing identification at the polls—because of the earlier error in
the registration process. 
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the Florida law under, inter alia,
the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act.233 The court
became stymied, however, by a static construction of materiality.
Despite the statutory text, the court focused on the materiality of
the underlying information sought, rather than the materiality of
the error on the record.234 It believed that evaluating the materiality
of the error itself would lead to absurd results.235 The only way to
evaluate the materiality of an error, the court presumed, was to
gauge the magnitude of the mistake. Big errors would be material,
small ones would not.236 The only way to gauge the magnitude of a
mistake, in turn, would be to compare the mistake to the accurate
information.237 And with accurate information in hand, the original
mistake, no matter how large, never impacts the determination of
230. See id. at 1156; supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
232. FLA. STAT. § 97.053(6) (2006). The law has since been amended to allow voters to
correct their own errors as well. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.053(6) (LexisNexis 2012).
233. Browning I, 522 F.3d at 1173-74.
234. Compare id. at 1174-75 (“The mistaken premise in this argument is that the
materiality provision refers to the nature of the error rather than the nature of the underlying
information requested.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B) (2006) (“No person acting under color
of law shall ... deny the right of any individual to vote in any election because of an error or
omission ... if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual
is qualified under State law to vote.” (emphasis added)). 
235. See Browning I, 522 F.3d at 1174-75.
236. Id. at 1175 n.23.
237. See id.
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the voter’s qualifications.238 Thus, reasoned the court, because no
error could be deemed material once it was possible to gauge the
error’s magnitude, the Civil Rights Act could not possibly have
intended to focus on the materiality of the error.239
The Eleventh Circuit was driven toward the magnitude of an
error as a measurable standard for materiality only because it
believed it could not find all errors immaterial once they are sup-
planted by accurate information. Recognizing the dynamic nature
of materiality, though, releases the court from its own logical box:
it allows decision makers to distinguish between meaningful errors
and nonmeaningful errors, based not on size but on time. At the
moment the erroneous information is first evaluated, it is material,
and may prevent the would-be voter from voting without violating
federal law, if it creates real and reasonable doubt as to whether the
individual in question is qualified or not. If such an error is never
corrected, it continues to be material, and may continue to block the
would-be voter from casting a valid ballot. If such an error is
corrected or superseded, and the accurate information revealed, the
error will always become immaterial—but that is precisely what the
statute should contemplate. At the time when there is no longer a
doubt about the individual’s qualifications, the earlier and newly
immaterial error cannot be used as a procedural hitch to deprive the
eligible individual of a vote.
That is, the fact that many of the errors on prerequisite forms can
later be mooted—that errors that had once been material can later
be revealed as immaterial—does not strip the materiality provision
of meaning. To the contrary, because it allows eligible voters to vote
when there is no longer any doubt about their qualifications,
recognizing the dynamic nature of materiality would give the Civil
Rights Act’s materiality provision precisely the meaning that was
intended.
C. State Law
Beyond the Civil Rights Act, federal law does not presently seem
to impose the materiality principle upon states. But states might
238. See id.
239. See id. at 1174-75.
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impose the principle on themselves. As mentioned above, Professor
Rick Hasen has identified a “Democracy Canon” of statutory in-
terpretation, with roots at least as early as 1885;240 under this
canon, state courts generally favor the validity of expressed
preferences of eligible voters in the interpretation of ambiguous
election-related statutes.241 This canon of construction would, in
many ways, seek to construe state law consistently with the mate-
riality principle when errors are at issue. Under the Democracy
Canon, eligible citizens would be permitted to vote valid ballots,
despite violations of procedural regulations, when there is at least
some ambiguity as to the regulations’ mandatory or directory
nature.242
Professor Hasen’s descriptive account of the Democracy Canon
seems accurate, and I agree with its ultimate normative goals.
Nevertheless, I share the hesitation of scholars who have criticized
the application of substantive canons of construction as an exercise
in inconsistency.243 Given the futility of squeezing all plausible
ambiguity from legislative codes, the search for statutory ambiguity
seems to depend largely on the will of the judge in question;
deciding when a statute is or is not sufficiently ambiguous to deploy
the Democracy Canon does not seem meaningfully removed from
equally indeterminate estimations of “substantial” compliance with
procedural regulations.244
Instead of relying on canons of construction, I would prefer to see
states adopt the materiality principle expressly, as a statutory basis
for determining not how election procedures are construed, but
when they may be applied to preclude the vote of an elector. The
materiality principle does not question the validity or propriety of
any given electoral regulation in safeguarding the reliable adminis-
tration of an election, and it does not assert that the regulation
240. Hasen, Democracy Canon, supra note 9, at 71.
241. See id. at 71, 84.
242. See id. 
243. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 27-29 (1997).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 68; see also Hasen, Democracy Canon, supra
note 9, at 122-23 (suggesting deployment of the Democracy Canon to count write-in votes
without marked boxes next to the write-in space, despite a state election law stating that “no
write-in vote shall be counted unless the voting space next to the write-in space is marked or
slotted”).
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adopts different meanings in different contexts. It merely states
that the regulation in question should yield when its particular
purpose in ensuring that only eligible voters cast valid ballots is no
longer served. Legislative majorities that reliably represent
pluralities of their communities should be eager to see such statutes
in place.
Some states have already adopted the materiality principle,
although mostly in discrete scenarios, for certain ballots in certain
circumstances. Several states, following the model set by the federal
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)
for overseas voters,245 have adopted this materiality principle with
respect to misspellings in the name of a write-in candidate.246 At
least six states have enacted broader materiality provisions, beyond
the write-in context.247 
At least at one point, Alabama appeared to have gone farther still.
In 1993, the Alabama Supreme Court ratified not merely a version
of the static materiality principle but a procedure recognizing the
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(c)(3) (2000) (“Any abbreviation, misspelling, or other minor
variation in the form of the name of a candidate or a political party shall be disregarded in
determining the validity of the ballot, if the intention of the voter can be ascertained.”).
246. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.15.360(d)(5) (West 2012) (adopting the same
standard for write-in ballots generally); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 7-5-205(4) (West 2012) (same); IND.
CODE § 3-12-1-1.7(a)(4) (2012) (same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-523(7)(c) (West 2011) (same).
247. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-8.5-105 (West 2012) (allowing a provisional ballot
to count, despite the omission of information, if an official is able to determine that the elector
was eligible); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 97 (West 2012) (“No [absentee] ballot ... shall
be rejected for any immaterial addition, omission or irregularity in the preparation or
execution of any writing or affidavit required by [the laws regulating the absentee voting
process].”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1002(6) (2011) (allowing a provisional ballot to count, despite
errors or omissions in registration materials or on the ballot itself, if the errant or omitted
“information is not necessary to determine the eligibility of the voter to cast a ballot”); N.Y.
ELEC. LAW app. § 6210.13(a)(2) (McKinney 2011) (“A vote for any candidate or ballot measure
shall not be rejected solely because the voter failed to follow instructions for marking the
ballot. If, for any reason, it is impossible to determine the choice of the voter for any candidate
or ballot question, the vote for that candidate or ballot question shall be considered void.”); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-07-31(1) (West 2011) (“If a voter's mistake or omission in the
completion of a document [related to absentee voting] does not prevent determining whether
a covered voter is eligible to vote, the mistake or omission does not invalidate the document.”);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-20-24(a) (2012) (allowing an absentee ballot to count, despite immaterial
errors, omissions, or irregularities); see also Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 So. 2d 206, 218 (La.
2000) (adding to a “substantial compliance” standard the caveat that an error in absentee
balloting will only be preclusive if it “adversely affects the sanctity of the ballot and the
integrity of the election,” which may amount to a materiality standard).
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dynamic component of materiality as well. In Williams v. Lide,248
the court addressed a county commissioner’s race that left one
candidate ahead by four votes on Election Day, and his opponent ten
votes ahead five months later.249 Of particular relevance, several
voters cast absentee ballots accompanied by flawed affidavits.250 The
trial court discounted errors on these affidavits unrelated to the
voters’ addresses, signatures, and reasons for voting absentee—that
is, errors that were immaterial to ensuring the voters’ eligibility.251
Yet several disputed ballots with material flaws remained. So the
trial court took testimony from the voters in question, allowing the
voters to present evidence rendering some of the earlier flaws imma-
terial.252 Despite serious (but not strategic) errors in the original
paperwork, once those errors became immaterial, the associated
ballots were counted.253 Other states can best realize the purposes
of their election procedures by adopting, and codifying, the Williams
court’s approach.254
248. 628 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam).
249. Id. at 533.
250. Id. at 536.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. The extent to which Alabama currently maintains this approach is not clear.
Particularly in the wake of Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995), which struck as a
violation of due process an allegedly inconsistent exercise of postelection leniency by the
Alabama Supreme Court, id. at 581, inconsistency seems to have—ironically—increased.
Some more recent Alabama cases purport to follow Williams while finding errors to be
preclusive, but it is possible that the errors in question in those cases were effectively deemed
material. See, e.g., Washington v. Hill, 960 So. 2d 643 (Ala. 2006); Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.
2d 1113 (Ala. 1999). Others seem to adopt a view of compliance far removed from materiality,
and have found error in the Williams trial court process of allowing postelection testimony to
cure earlier errors. See, e.g., Townson v. Stonicher, 933 So. 2d 1062, 1064-67 (Ala. 2005)
(refusing to accept identification that did not precisely meet the statutory standard, and
refusing to permit later introduction of the proper identification at trial).
254. Michigan very nearly took up the challenge in 2012, in a bill ultimately vetoed by the
governor. The bill added a new requirement that voters attest to their citizenship on absentee
ballots, but allowed voters to correct, in postelection proceedings, their failures to comply. See
S.803 § 766a, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012) (“If an election is contested in a court, an
absent voter ballot that was not counted because the absent voter did not answer the
citizenship question in writing to the clerk before the polls closed on election day ... may be
counted if the court determines that the voter was a citizen at the time of the election in
question.”).
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CONCLUSION
Despite general concern about the aggregate decline of competi-
tive elections,255 photo-finish races will not disappear. When an
election heads into “overtime,” it tests the capacity of the infrastruc-
ture of our democracy to deliver a result that is both inclusive and
reliable, and that is perceived to be both inclusive and reliable. In
the 2000 presidential election, that capacity broke down in the face
of numerous errors by voters and officials, with serious and
lingering consequences. Nearly a decade later, our conceptual
approach to election-related errors remains inadequate, particularly
in the event of races close enough to head into “overtime.”
This Article suggests one component of a solution, dependent
upon the robust application of a materiality principle found, inter
alia, in an underrecognized provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Reorienting the analytical framework for evaluating the conse-
quences of election procedures in light of this materiality principle
may be able to resolve some of the conflict between the need for
regulations to administer elections and the ultimate purposes those
regulations are intended to fulfill. Particularly by recognizing the
dynamic nature of that materiality, it is possible to resolve election-
related flaws in a manner better tailored both to the rationale for
election procedures and to the more foundational reasons why we
vote. 
255. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protected from Politics: Diminishing
Margins of Electoral Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1121, 1123-
25 (2007); David Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of
Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144, 155 (2006).
